For a time, Kenya seemed poised to become the most influential East African ally of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
From Félix Tshisekedi’s close relationship with former President Uhuru Kenyatta to the expansion of Kenyan businesses into Congolese markets, Nairobi had built a strong diplomatic and economic foothold in Kinshasa. However, those ties are now unraveling.
The collapse of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), growing mistrust between President William Ruto and Tshisekedi, and Kenya’s shifting diplomatic stance on the M23 rebels, who recently took over part of eastern Congo, have driven a wedge between the two countries.
Kinshasa has pivoted southward, embracing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as its new security partner, a shift that has weakened Kenya’s influence in the region and raised uncertainty about Nairobi’s long-term commercial ambitions in the DRC.
Historically, the DRC had stronger ties with SADC rather than the EAC. Countries like South Africa, Angola, and Zimbabwe had been Kinshasa’s traditional security partners, particularly during the Second Congo War (1998–2003), when they intervened militarily to prop up the Congolese government against Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels.
SADC remained the DRC’s preferred regional bloc for many years, especially in economic and military cooperation. However, when Félix Tshisekedi became president in 2019, he sought to redefine the DRC’s regional alliances.
There were several reasons for this shift. Tshisekedi wanted to break from the influence of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, who had ruled the DRC for nearly two decades and whose alliances were deeply rooted in SADC.
Eager to establish himself as an independent leader, Tshisekedi looked to the EAC as a new platform for diplomatic and economic engagement.
The EAC also offered immediate trade and investment opportunities that SADC could not match. Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda had strong commercial interests in eastern DRC, making economic integration with East Africa a logical step. In April 2022, the DRC officially joined the EAC, opening its markets to Kenyan and Ugandan businesses while also securing access to Mombasa’s port for its exports.
Security concerns also played a role. Tshisekedi sought new security partners to stabilise eastern DRC, particularly in dealing with M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).
While SADC had been hesitant to intervene immediately, the EAC, led by Kenya and Uganda, was quick to engage. Kenya played a key role in deploying the EACRF, and Uganda had already stationed troops in Ituri and North Kivu under Operation Shujaa to fight ADF rebels.
At the same time, Tshisekedi believed aligning with the EAC could counter Rwanda’s growing influence in the region. His presidency saw a rise in anti-Rwandan sentiment, fueled by accusations that Rwanda was backing M23.
By strengthening ties with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, Tshisekedi sought to build a regional bloc that could stand up to Kigali.
Kenya’s involvement in the DRC was largely driven by Uhuru Kenyatta’s personal and political investments. After Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga reconciled through the famous 2018 “Handshake,” Odinga introduced Tshisekedi to Kenyatta.
Seeing an opportunity to expand Kenya’s influence in the region, Kenyatta supported Tshisekedi’s 2018 presidential campaign.
Once in power, Tshisekedi leaned on Kenyatta for diplomatic and economic support. Kenya facilitated the DRC’s entry into the EAC in 2022, and Kenyan businesses aggressively expanded into Congolese markets. Kenyatta also positioned Kenya as a key mediator in the DRC conflict, launching the "Nairobi Process" to broker peace between Kinshasa and rebel groups.
Kenya’s influence peaked when it spearheaded the deployment of the EACRF, a regional military force aimed at stabilising eastern DRC. Kenyan troops formed the backbone of this operation, reinforcing Nairobi’s diplomatic and military presence in the country.
However, Kinshasa grew increasingly frustrated with the EACRF’s failure to take aggressive action against M23. Tshisekedi accused the force of “cohabiting” with the rebels and, by December 2023, refused to renew its mandate, effectively forcing Kenyan troops out of the DRC.
With the EACRF failing to meet his expectations, Tshisekedi revived security ties with SADC. His election as Chair of the SADC Heads of State Summit in August 2022 allowed him to consolidate his influence in Southern Africa.
By mid-2023, he invited Angolan forces into eastern DRC to combat M23, and by late 2023 and early 2024, SADC deployed troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi. His increasing alignment with SADC signaled a decisive shift away from the EAC.
By June 2024, Tshisekedi boycotted the EAC Heads of State Summit, further solidifying his pivot to SADC. Kenya, once seen as the DRC’s key East African ally, had been sidelined.
The deterioration of Kenya-DRC relations went beyond military cooperation—it spilled into diplomatic and economic tensions.
In April 2024, Kenya Airways’ station manager in Kinshasa, Lydia Mbotela, and her Congolese colleague, Olivier Lufungula, were arrested at N’Djili International Airport.
Accepting cargo containing banknotes from a Congolese bank destined for the US. In response, Kenya Airways suspended flights to the DRC, escalating the already growing diplomatic rift. This followed the DRC recalling its ambassador to Kenya in December 2023, a clear sign of diplomatic breakdown.
Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi travelled to Kinshasa, leading to the resumption of Kenya Airways flights. However, relations remained tense.
Shortly after Mudavadi’s visit, President Ruto made a controversial statement in an interview with Jeune Afrique, claiming that M23 was a Congolese issue and absolving Rwanda of accusations that it supported the rebel group.
Two months later, at a Brookings panel, Tshisekedi publicly criticised Ruto, stating that he had “managed [the Nairobi Process] very badly” by siding with Rwanda. This effectively ended Kenya’s role as a mediator in the DRC conflict.
As Kenya’s influence in the DRC collapsed, Ruto was also facing mounting political pressure at home. A wave of youth-led protests erupted in Kenya against his government’s economic policies, tax hikes, and corruption scandals.
These protests weakened Ruto’s domestic credibility, forcing him to focus more on internal crises rather than foreign policy. The instability at home also made Kenya less attractive as a regional power, undermining its position as a mediator abroad.
With diplomatic influence waning and military engagement in the DRC ending in failure, Kenya now faces an uncertain future in Congo’s evolving power dynamics.
While the DRC’s ambassador to Kenya has resumed his duties in Nairobi and Kenya’s newly appointed ambassador has taken office in Kinshasa, the political rift remains.
Without Tshisekedi’s support, Kenya’s ambitious commercial expansion into the DRC may stall, benefiting rival regional players like Uganda, Tanzania, and SADC countries.
Denied the Western funding it sought, the EACRF never had the resources or political backing needed to succeed.
Ruto’s government also replaced many of the diplomats who had worked under Kenyatta on the DRC strategy, further weakening Kenya’s ability to navigate the crisis. As a result, Ruto has found it increasingly difficult to maintain relations with Tshisekedi or advance Kenya’s economic interests in the DRC.
With President Ruto now engaging more closely with Raila Odinga, it remains to be seen whether this new political dynamic will have any impact on Kenya’s deteriorating relationship with the DRC.
Given Odinga’s historical ties with Félix Tshisekedi—dating back to his close relationship with Tshisekedi’s father, Étienne—there is a possibility that Raila could serve as a bridge in mending relations between Nairobi and Kinshasa.
However, Tshisekedi’s pivot to SADC has been deliberate, and his frustration with the EAC and Kenya’s handling of the peace process remains deep-seated.
Kenya now stands at a crossroads. Whether Ruto’s new political alliance with Odinga will shift Nairobi’s approach toward Kinshasa or whether Kenya will have to accept its diminishing role in the DRC is something that will unfold in the coming months.
What is clear is that the region’s shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts will continue to test East Africa’s geopolitical landscape.
