In 2024, ‘the Unhappy Horn’ is a fitting description of Africa’s most volatile region. This ‘unhappiness’ stems from what has been christened the ‘Abiy Project’ — a recidivistic military strategy to reinvent the now defunct Ethiopian (Abyssinian) Empire.
This project is a subject a new unflattering biography of Abi by the renowned correspondent of the Economist Magazine, Martin Gardner titled: The Abiy Project: God, Power and War in the New Ethiopia (June 2024).
The region has dangerously swung from ‘Abiymania’ in 2018, when Abiy Ahmed Ali became Prime Minister, to intense ‘Abiyphobia’ after 2020. Abiy’s peace deal with Eritrea in 2019 won him the Nobel Peace Prize and kindled hopes of improved regional stability.
Sadly, Abiy failed to manage Ethiopia’s diversity, unify the country, silence the guns in Oromia and grow the economy. At home, he has waged three wars: Ethiopia is reeling from the aftermath of a calamitous war in the Tigray region, an internecine war in Amhara and a civil war in Oromia.
Populism, ethno-nationalism, militarism and expansionism are driving his domestic action and foreign policy. “Ethiopia’s existence is tied to the Red Sea,” he said in 2018. This may have sounded the death knell to Eritrea-Ethiopia détente. Eritrea has the ports of Massawa and Assab, Ethiopia’s gateway to the world and basis of naval power before 1963.
In Somalia, Abiy literally sowed wind, and Ethiopia is now reaping the whirlwind. In January 2024, Addis Ababa surprised the world by a territorial deal with Somaliland, which gave Ethiopia a 20-Kilometer naval and commercial base near Berbera. In turn, Addis Ababa would recognize Somalia’s breakaway territory, which has been pursuing independence for 33 years.
Ethiopia’s misadventure has triggered the Horn’s worst diplomatic storm since the Ogaden War in 1978. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has stepped up diplomacy to ensure that Ethiopia does not take advantage of its feeble military state and vulnerability after the exit of the African Union Transition Forces (ATMIS) to unilaterally implement the port deal.
As a result, the African Union, United States, European Union and China have all defended Somalia’s sovereignty. Somalia’s new status as a non-permanent member of the United Nations security Council has strengthened its diplomatic muscle to isolate Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s military offensive
Beyond diplomacy, the deal came as Somalia was effectively entering its post-War stage. The lifting of the arms embargo on Mogadishu has enabled it to progressively secure arms and military capacity to protect and assert its authority over its maritime and terrestrial territories, including Somaliland. On August 22, Mogadishu put Addis Ababa on notice that it would suspend Ethiopian Airlines flights to Somalia unless it repudiates its agreement with Somaliland.
Ethiopia’s port deal has rekindled the division question of the presence of over 4,000 Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) troops in Somalia as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Besides calling for immediate exit of Ethiopia’s ATMIS troops, Mogadishu has completely also ruled out Ethiopia’s participation in the new African Union Support Mission in Somalia (ASMIS) approved as successor to ATMIS.
Security strategists in Villa Somalia are in a fret over a possible repeat of the Ethiopian blitzkrieg in 2006, when Addis Ababa, supported by the United States, stormed Somalia and deposed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), giving rise to the anti-Ethiopian insurgency that birthed al-Shabaab.
Arguably, this is the result Somalia entered into a Defence pact with Turkey in March. This deal enables Turkey to supply arms to Somalia, help protect its land and sea resources, and training and equipping Somali soldiers and sailors.
Somalia is also adeptly playing on the transition to the new African Union Support Mission in Somalia (ASMIS) to pre-emptively neuter possible Ethiopia’s military offensive. On August 14, Mogadishu signed a defence pact with Egypt as an effective deterrent strategy against Ethiopia, which has a running dispute with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
On August 27, two Egyptian planes carrying weapons and ammunition landed in Mogadishu as part of the military aid delivered under the new pact, including sophisticated weapons and armored vehicles. These are part of more than a dozen planes that reportedly touched down in Mogadishu.
Sources indicated that a total of 10,000 Egyptian soldiers are set to be deployed in parts of Somalia, including the South-West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug regions of Somalia. Of these, 5,000 are part of the AUSSOM forces, and is part of more than a dozen planes. 5,000 will operate independently from the peace mission, especially in Gedo region, near Ethiopian border.
Recognition of Somaliland
If the Turkish defence deal with Somalia rattled both Ethiopia and Somaliland, the Egyptian military pivot to the country has set alarm bells ringing in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa. “The transition from the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to a new support mission is fraught with dangers to the region,” Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lamented in a statement on August 28, 2024. With the entry of Egypt, Addis Ababa has warned that the region has entered uncharted waters. It has Mogadishu of “colluding with external actors” to “destabilize the region” and “inflame tension”.
On its part, Somaliland issued a statement on August 29, 2024, which condemned Egyptian military presence in Somalia.
All diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between Somalia and Ethiopia have hit dead ends. Kenya’s initial attempt to broker “peaceful resolution of differences” between Ethiopia and Somalia failed. Ethio-Somali peace talks sponsored by Turkey have only embarrassed Ankara, with zero outcomes.
In the words of Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, the Ankara talks have been a “waste of time, energy and Ankara’s money”. A third round of talks is set for September 17, but this is a mere face-saving move.
Ankara has been trying to negotiate two non-negotiables in Magadishu’s diplomacy. Somalia’s territorial sovereignty is a red line. In August 17, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud proclaimed that Mogadishu would not hold further talks until Ethiopia “recognizes the sovereignty of Somalia.”
The way out is clear: Ethiopia should abandon the Port deal and recognition of Somaliland as sovereign state, both of which are clearly an assault of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Professor Peter Kagwanja is a former Government Advisor and Strategist and currently Chief Executive at the Africa Policy Institute.
