Mr Noordin Haji was one of my favourite public officers during the five years he served as Director of Public Prosecutions between 2018 and 2023. He was approachable, a good communicator and always ready to engage with the media.
And it was not just public relations, for he was recognised widely for professionalism and integrity in the running of a much-maligned office that had gained notoriety over the years for throwing away high-profile criminal cases.
Mr Haji was known to have resisted intense pressure from President Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration to file frivolous criminal charges against politicians who had fallen afoul of the regime, particularly those linked to the internal insurrection driven by then Deputy President William Ruto.
His refusal to prosecute some of the files placed before his desk brought him into open conflict with then Director of Criminal Investigations George Kinoti, who had turned the office into a political enforcement arm.
Indeed, he was recognised with several awards such as Jurist of the Year from the International Commission of Jurists, and the Leadership Integrity Award from Transparency International.
Towards the end of his tenure in 2023, however, Mr Haji generated controversy by withdrawing several cases he had filed against politicians close to the new President Ruto. The official explanation was lack of adequate evidence to sustain conviction. Even if those might have been some of the case pushed by Mr Kinoti, questions were asked why the DPP had agreed to charge the suspects in the first place.
Rewarded by President Ruto
Mr Haji’s carefully cultivated reputation was damaged, resulting in withdrawal of the Leadership Integrity Award from Transparency International.
For his pains, however, Mr Haji was rewarded by President Ruto with appointment to the powerful post of Director-General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), returning to the institution he had served most of his working life, having risen to rank of deputy director by the time he left in 2018.
His final months as DPP saw Mr Haji eagerly serving the regime in power; he seems to have continued on the same mien as the NIS boss, if accusations that he was behind abduction, torture, illegal confinement and enforced disappearance of government critics hold any water.
The NIS has previously been mentioned in regard to the controversial crackdown launched in response to the Gen Z-led protests from last June, but most of the focus has been on Mr Kinoti’s successor Mohammed Amin, Inspector-General of Police Douglas Kanja and his predecessor Japhet Koome.
Mr Haji’s name was first mentioned adversely at the height of the Gen Z protests when then Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua sensationally blamed the NIS boss of intelligence failures before the unprecedented revolt erupted.
The DP also accused the intelligence chief of concocting falsehoods trying to link him (Gachagua) and other senior Central Kenya politicians to financing and planning of the protests.
Tool of political repression
Mr Gachagua wanted Mr Haji sacked, but he was the one instead shown the door through impeachment a few months later.
Then came the recent allegations by Public Service Cabinet Secretary Justin Muturi, directly linking Mr Haji to the abductions.
Attorney-General during the protests, Mr Muturi’s son was one of the early victims of the abduction squads. The CS broke seven months of silence to sensationally claim that when he sought intervention from the highest office in the land, he was within earshot when President Ruto phoned Mr Haji and ordered the release of his son.
The CS should probably be packing his bags ahead of the frenzied lynch mobs that will be mobilised to demand his sacking, but the more pertinent issue is if, indeed, Mr Haji has turned the powerful intelligence service into a tool of political repression.
That would be betrayal of all the laws governing the National Intelligence Service, and particularly the reforms instituted by the last spy chief under President Daniel Moi, Brigadier Wilson Boinett. The dreaded Kenya Police Special Branch, the precursor of the NIS, was notorious for running torture chambers, having government critics jailed on trumped-up charges, and a series of political assassinations. It was transformed into a professional intelligence gathering and analysis outfit.
If Mr Haji wants to revive the old dark, evil ways of a security agency that relies on criminal methods to serve the political agenda of those in power, he must be relieved of his duties, and called to personally account for every misdeed.
