Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize just 18 months into his term -- an impressive feat that suggested the country with a dark history of repression finally had a safe pair of hands at the helm.
The international recognition for implementing domestic reforms and a peace deal to end decades-long conflict with neighbouring Eritrea was not the only first for the youthful ex-military man.
When Abiy Ahmed was announced as the Nobel Peace Prize Winner in 2019
Earlier in April 2018, he had become the first person from the Oromo ethnic group to hold Ethiopia’s top seat and he set out to ensure Africa’s second-most populous country shook off its tainted image to forge a liberal society that fit in the free world.
And so Abiy freed political detainees, welcomed exiled figures, embraced a free media and the icing on the cake -- the truce with Ethiopia’s longstanding foe, Eritrea – all together, hastened his march towards international stardom.
But things appear to have begun to unravel in the nation that survived the colonial scramble for Africa, with reports of killings and destruction of property following a wave of violence.
And the crackdown on dissent is back, with brutal attacks on government critics by security forces. Killings blamed on state agents, torture, unlawful detentions and a media clampdown -- an important media house was shut down -- signal a campaign to silence criticism.
Human Rights Watch on August 20 protested the detention of dozens of opposition members and journalists for prolonged periods and often without charge since late June 2020.
“The actions of Ethiopia’s investigative authorities raise concerns that they have not moved on from past practices of arresting first, and investigating later,” said Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
In a statement posted on the group’s website, Bader added: “The authorities should promptly bring credible charges based on clear facts and evidence against the detainees or ensure their release.”
The slide to anarchy has raised doubts whether the celebration of Abiy as a breath of fresh air came too soon. Or is he a victim of Ethiopia’s entrenched militancy? Is he coming up against strong forces determined to protect the status-quo?
The government insists it is struggling to enforce law and order in the midst of mass disturbances instigated by terrorists and people trying to divide the nation.
“The reforms journey is a long and tumultuous one. And our operating context is and has always been complex, with vested interests by many. Positive change does not come to the impatient, but to those committed to the journey.
It requires working diligently every day in the interest of national unity and cohesion. Let us not be distracted by those with an agenda that is not in favour of Ethiopia’s prosperity,” Abiy tweet on May 29.
Some analysts say it is too soon to judge Abiy harshly, arguing moving from repressive regimes to democratic societies is problematic.
“Transitions from authoritarianism to a more open system are always challenging and in a context like Ethiopia, with its size, population and history, that was always going to be the case. Abiy started with what seemed a sincere desire to democratise and he implemented significant change. But he could have been more consultative and worked through institutions better, rather than rely mainly on charisma and instinct. Now that a wave of instability has hit, it would be a mistake to go back to the old authoritarian playbook. Instead, organising a national dialogue to craft consensus and ease tensions, would be a better way forward.” says Murithi Mutiga, the project director for the Horn of Africa at the Crisis Group.
“He is battling the delicate balance to make Ethiopia a more open society and at the same time keep it more stable and cohesive,” notes Ndungu Wainaina, the executive director of the International Center for Policy and Conflict.
Wainaina suggests that while Abiy is keen to pursue “accommodative politics” he could also be getting insecure about his hold on power. But he cautions any attempts to roll back the gains will backfire spectacularly.
But many commentators also report a more sinister and complex situation. They point to the systematic methods of the attacks, as well as a reluctance by security forces to immediately intervene. Some suggest that the regime may be sending agents to provoke peaceful protestors in an attempt to ignite inter-communal violence.
It is exposing the historic fraught relationship between the Ethiopian state and the citizenry. No matter the government in power, the Ethiopian state has displayed an essentially ultra-violent relationship with its subjects.
The crisis has been caused by reneging on a political settlement. And former strongman Meles Zenawi (1991-2012) created a mess that others have had to inherit following his death.
The biggest misrepresentation of the situation has been to portray ethnic federalism as the cause of the conflict. It is not. It was the culmination of the struggle to settle Ethiopia’s long-stalled transition from an empire dominated by one elite to a country shared by many nations.
This is not to insist that federation alone would be the panacea for all of Ethiopia’s problems. However, the goal of responsible politics should be stability. And stability is best guaranteed by consensus and respecting agreements whether an Independence settlement, constitutional term limits, coalition pact or a peace treaty.
This contradiction played out after the long wars that four different nationalities waged against first Emperor Selassie’s throne, and then against Colonel Mengistu’s military regime that had overthrown the emperor in 1974.
The fighting ended in 1991, and post-Mengistu Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government — a coalition of rebel groups that had been fighting since the time of Emperor Selassie — was to finally settle this matter by federating the country. This was formally achieved with the current constitution, promulgated in 1995.
However, as the new head of state, Zenawi, leader of the Tigrayan rebels — had other plans. At the bidding of Western interests, he decided to derail the federal aspirations that had driven the armed struggles and re-impose the unitary state of Col Mengistu and Emperor Selassie.
A sinisterly clever and determined man, he embarked on a path of elaborate skullduggery to make this happen. Key among these was to create “clones” of the other political forces his own Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) had united with, and work with them instead.
The most significant dispute had been between Zenawi’s TPLF, and the leadership of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The Oromo are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.
Zenawi embarked on a campaign of hacking away at the OLF. He disrupted its support base in the countryside through bribery, repression and exiling, as well as physically liquidating those sections of the new armed forces that had come out of the OLF army. Thousands of Oromo soldiers may have been murdered.
Abiy is a product of that process. Many Mengistu soldiers captured as prisoners of war by the TPLF and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front were willing to adapt to the new realities. Some Oromo agreed to form organisations to enable Zenawi to undermine OLF, as the anti-Mengistu coalition prepared for victory.
Thus the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation (OPDO) was born and then also went on to recruit lower level clerical workers of Mengistu’s former bureaucracy to fill their ranks quickly.
Abiy was among those recruited into its ranks as a child soldier. As part of the ruling EPRDF coalition in power, OPDO became the only permitted Oromo voice in the ruling coalition, and in the regional elected positions. It later changed its name to Oromo Democratic Party, which Abiy has been using to lead the ruling coalition.
Zenawi’s mission was clear: to keep the Ethiopian state both intact, and unitary, much as he had led an ethno-nationalist group, and had formed a united front with other such groups with a promise of federating the country.
Some experts attribute this betrayal to a series of interactions Zenawi and others in the TPLF leadership had with Western intelligence operatives, during the dying days of the Mengistu regime. At the time, it was obvious that the ethno-nationalist formations would end up in power.
They insist that Zenawi agreed to “special terms”, under which, in return for not radically altering Ethiopia’s unitary make-up, he would enjoy significant Western backing once in power.
After this, the West arranged a smooth transition between Mengistu’s forces and the incoming rebels. They used the cover of the relief aid coming in for victims of famine to strengthen the TPLF faction. Some analysts estimate that of some 100,000 rebel soldiers poised to finally drive out Mengistu, perhaps 90,000 may have been under the TPLF.
The Western intelligence agencies also arranged to have the inner circle of Mengistu’s outgoing regime and their followers find safe exit routes. This may have involved asking the Israeli Defence Force to cross over the Red Sea, and provide a military buffer in the capital between the departing Mengistu, and the incoming rebels, for a few days.
In power, Zenawi was, therefore, simply holding up his end of the bargain with the West, and possibly his own arcane personal ambitions. He placed his hopes on an accelerated technocratic development of the country’s resources into mining, light manufacturing and agribusiness to check the influence of nationalist movements.
He did not succeed. Ethiopian GDP figures may have surged under him, but were largely driven by heavy investment in infrastructure and massive dispossession of farm land around the capital, which created a real estate-driven economy, while increasing landlessness.
“The economy was on the ropes, done by a combination of frenetic growth, expensive infrastructure modernisation and unsustainable debt. The treasury barely had enough foreign reserves to cover a month’s worth of exports,” writes Rashid Abdi in the Addis Standard.
Zenawi had responded to the resultant grievances as he always did. “We don’t have teargas; we only have bullets,” he once gruffly answered Uganda’s then-ambassador, who had most politely queried if there were no other ways of managing the demonstrations in protest at the handling of the 2005 elections.
At the time of his death, Zenawi was dealing pre-emptively with the prospect of new civil disturbances arising out of his economic failures. In 2009-2010 he came up with the anti-terrorism law to curb potential uprisings inspired by the Arab Spring, under which many opposition politicians, journalists and activists were imprisoned until 2018.
The reign of his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, was short-lived because he was unable to contain the explosion of discontent that had built up.
In 2014 the EPRDF government unilaterally began further expanding the boundaries of the capital city, thereby encroaching on territory constitutionally recognised as being Oromo.
The youth uprising began, drawing in not just the Oromo youth, but also other groups, including ethnic Amhara who had also borne the brunt of Zenawi’s regime.
This is why Abiy began with a reformist programme, and why that brought so much hope. Actualising the federal constitution, and dismantling Zenawi’s dictatorial tools, was an assumed central plank of the prime minister’s political mission.
But the reforms appear to have stalled. The original grievance that sparked the uprising: The Addis Ababa Master Plan, has never been formally withdrawn, and land grabs continue. And the population largely comprising the youth has become restless.
The ongoing attempt to turn the governing coalition into a new single entity called the Prosperity Party, which is seen as a backdoor attempt to further subvert the federal arrangement and the postponement of the scheduled elections, have cast doubts on the PM’s commitment to reforms.
The heavily militarised response to the continuing disturbances, and in particular the arrest and assassination of key Oromo figures, including the revered Oromo musician Haacaalu Hundessa have raised suspicions.
And Abiy does not have the luxury to treat the Federation as a policy option. Federation is a constitutional matter in Ethiopia that closed off decades of conflict.
But the PM seems to only embrace his advocacy for a unitary State. The Oromo also hold the most possibly complicated historical relationship with the State. And with them making up over a third of the population, their grievances will reverberate through the body politic.
By being the first nominally Oromo leader of the country, Abiy was expected to bring at least temporary respite to Oromo nationalism. His initial approach had been to placate it by bringing many Oromo political personalities on board, and allowing Oromo language media to freely articulate community concerns for once, in the country’s long history.
In adopting its current constitution in 1995, the country agreed to federation, but Abiy, like all his predecessors will not deliver it.
The current game plan is to displace the current broad spectrum of Oromo political and cultural leadership, and replace it with a leadership fashioned after the objectives of Ethiopian state.
“Abiy is systematically going after every Oromo institution (even the traditional Abba Gadaa Council), major businessmen are exiled and their business being taken over/dismantled. Media houses closed, journalists disappeared or in jail,” explained one Oromo activist.
Numerous leaders and their organisations, many of whom had mobilised the support Abiy needed to rise to power, and whose unbanning and return from exile Abiy reciprocatively facilitated, such as firebrand Jawar Mohammed of the Oromo Federalist Congress, Dawud Ibsa of the Oromo Liberation Front, and others, are now in confinement.
Article 39 of the Federal constitution allows for secession. Abiy’s handling of the situation, on the back of previous oppressions, means that even if he were to have a change of heart and cleave to that constitution now, he would be running the risk of seeing a number of regions agitate to leave.
Certainly, the TPLF, having pulled out of the ruling coalition in protest of Abiy’s changes, are hypocritically making this threat, having resisted real regional autonomy for the whole time they ran the coalition government themselves.
This fear could be overstated. Most people wish simply to get on with their lives. The idea of breaking up Ethiopia could be seen as too extreme, even for those most mistreated by it historically.
Their biggest fear is a return to the horrors of the past, which seem to have returned after such a brief period of hope.
