South Sudan is likely to return to full-blown civil war unless the international community takes a radical approach to stabilise the country and re-engage in the peace process.
The agreement had a 36-month transition period . It established a unity government to reform institutions, draft a constitution, ensure transitional justice and conduct the country’s first election.
Seven years into the implementation process, however, South Sudan has yet to fulfil many of the peace deal’s commitments. These include demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, and training and establishing necessary unified forces .
The timeline for holding elections, another benchmark of the transition, has been extended until December 2026 . This moves the completion of the transition process to February 2027 from the initial January 2021 . It is the fourth such mutually agreed extension.
The challenges of the slow implementation of the peace agreement escalated in March 2025 , with violent clashes in the Upper Nile State and a political crisis. First vice-president Machar was put under house arrest . Reports say a convoy of more than 20 heavily armed vehicles forcefully entered Machar’s residence , disarmed his bodyguards, and held him and his wife Angelina Teny. Teny is South Sudan’s interior minister.
It is my view that the current crisis has little to do with the recent clashes. This crisis in South Sudan has been long in the making. It has its roots in the country’s faltering peace implementation process.
As part of my ongoing research , I have gathered data on the content and implementation of 42 comprehensive civil war peace agreements in 33 countries dating back to 1989. In none of these agreements and countries have I observed delays in implementation like in South Sudan – or the arrest of a main opposition leader who is a signatory to a peace agreement.
South Sudan’s path to peace since its independence in 2011 has been challenging. Key to achieving stability is the peace process itself. The international community must lead a radical push to get signatories to the 2018 peace deal to implement it. This approach is necessary for regional peace and stability – the ongoing violence could easily escalate and merge with the Sudan war and drag in Uganda .
The current crisis in South Sudan began in early March 2025 when the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces clashed with the White Army militia group. The White Army took control of the town of Nasir in the oil-rich Upper Nile State.
South Sudan’s kleptocratic leaders have been quick to associate Machar, the SPLM-IO leader, with the White Army. This is largely because the militia group primarily recruits from the Nuer ethnic group, which Machar belongs to.
The training and deployment of unified forces, and establishment of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing are lagging behind. So are constitutional and electoral reforms, including a census to determine voter numbers, as well as a hybrid court for war crimes and a reparations authority.
The implementation process began to slow down when military leaders loyal to Kiir started to co-opt generals loyal to Machar. Leadership positions within the army were divided between military officials loyal to Kiir, Machar and other groups in June 2023. This diluted SPLM-IO’s influence in the unity government.
Rising tensions led to the Tumaini Peace Initiative , launched in May 2024 and hosted by the Kenyan government. This initiative aimed to bring other armed groups under the fold of the peace process. However, it undermined the 2018 peace deal by not tying the initiative to the revitalised agreement.
Over several rounds of peace talks , it has became clear that a segment of the ruling elite wants to influence the implementation of the 2018 deal to control political power – and therefore, South Sudan’s resources. The unfolding events show an effort to hold the peace process hostage towards this end.
The path to peace and stability in South Sudan is challenging. In my research , I have examined situations where multiple armed groups either continue to fight or new ones emerge in conflict situations.
My research consistently shows that the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements stabilises such situations by addressing security uncertainties, reforming institutions and addressing underlying grievances.
Stakeholders in South Sudan must prioritise the implementation of the 2018 peace agreement. Since the signatory parties are unwilling to implement the agreement, someone must step in to fill this void. With the entire peace process held hostage and key signatories of the peace agreement sidelined, this narrow path forward can only be charted with the support of and pressure from the international community.
Madhav Joshi is Research Professor & Associate Director, Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame.
