US president Donald Trump’s advisor on Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, announced in February 2026 that Washington and three Middle East states – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (collectively known as the Quad) – were close to finalising a detailed initiative aimed at ending Sudan’s war. The plan resembled the roadmap shared by the Quad in September 2025.
According to Boulos, the proposal had received preliminary approval from the two warring parties in the civil war: Sudan’s Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Meanwhile, the battlefield has produced a de facto territorial split . The army and its allies remain entrenched in eastern, northern and central Sudan, including the capital, Khartoum. The RSF controls much of western Sudan, including all Darfur states.
Active fighting is now largely concentrated in Kordofan , which lies between the two zones of control. The region represents 20% of Sudan’s territory, extends over roughly 390,000 square kilometres and has a population of around 8 million.
Continued military escalation, deep mistrust between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary forces, and the army’s refusal to legitimise the RSF undermine prospects for de-escalation.
Additionally, regional and international actors have yet to generate sufficient pressure for peace. Competing regional interests and continued external support for the warring parties reduce incentives for compromise. As a result, the most realistic outcome for now is a temporary humanitarian pause rather than a lasting political settlement.
an immediate ceasefire
unhindered humanitarian access
civilian protection
the launch of a political process leading to civilian governance
a reconstruction pathway supported by a pledged US$1.5 billion.
Media leaks suggest the proposal includes coordinated withdrawals by Sudanese warring parties from major cities.
Under the proposal, the RSF would pull back from key positions in South Kordofan and around El-Obeid, the closest RSF-controlled area to Khartoum. Army units in the capital would, meanwhile, be replaced by local police as part of efforts to prepare urban centres for civilian governance.
Despite the seriousness of this proposal, developments on the ground indicate that neither side is ready to de-escalate. The biggest obstacles continue to be:
Within hours of the initiative’s announcement, army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan publicly reiterated that he would not accept any political or military role for the RSF.
This stance aligns with reports that senior army figures objected to key provisions of the Quad proposal, particularly those allowing the RSF to retain local governance structures in areas under its control to facilitate aid delivery.
For the army, recognising such arrangements would amount to legitimising the RSF as a political actor.
2. The army’s broader insistence that it alone should oversee any reform of Sudan’s military institutions
Neither side appears to be preparing for withdrawals. On the contrary, recent weeks have seen escalating clashes and the opening of new fronts.
At the same time, the army has succeeded in lifting sieges on key towns in South Kordofan that had been encircled by the RSF for nearly two years. This increasingly complex military map makes agreement on withdrawal zones exceptionally difficult.
Regional and international dynamics remain a major obstacle. This includes some of the Quad’s members, who publicly endorse a ceasefire even as battlefield realities suggest otherwise. These actors have repeatedly denied accusations of providing military support to one side or the other .
As long as both Sudanese warring parties retain access to regional backing, there is little incentive to halt the fighting. Continued war allows them to compete over territory and extract resources while sidelining any meaningful civilian political alternative.
A breakthrough is possible. But it won’t happen quickly. A meaningful shift would require stronger international pressure.
Washington appears to be moving gradually in this direction as part of a broader effort to consolidate western influence in Sudan while curbing rival regional and global actors. This is happening most notably amid concerns over Russia’s reported interest in establishing a naval facility in Port Sudan.
A pillar of this approach is drying up the drivers of war, especially arms flows. In December 2025, the US Congress passed legislation expanding American intelligence engagement in Sudan to monitor and expose external actors fuelling the conflict. The language of the bill suggests that all suppliers are potential targets.
In this context, media leaks about external involvement in Sudan can be seen as a form of political pressure on arms suppliers. This places current providers in a difficult position: either align with Washington’s framework or risk confrontation with it.
Regional actors may gradually follow suit if Washington demonstrates sustained resolve. Egypt, in particular, could pivot towards a ceasefire as the conflict edges closer to Blue Nile state near Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, a core national security concern for Cairo.
These dynamics could eventually restrict external military support to both Sudanese parties, narrowing their options and increasing the geopolitical cost of continued war. In this context, maintaining current suppliers of Russian , Chinese and Iranian weapons could provoke countermeasures by Washington and its allies, a costly gamble for both sides.
Over time, this may push the army and the RSF towards negotiations, at least to secure a humanitarian ceasefire.
Written by Samir Ramzy, researcher at Helwan University.
