Response by Police and Provincial Administration
In accordance with our terms of reference, one of the main areas of our inquiry was to find out whether and to what extent the local administration and police were prepared for the violence that erupted, and how they ultimately responded to it.
We shall now discuss the evidence presented before us in this area, which indicates that the police and the local administration were caught totally unprepared by the violence.
We shall examine the police response in light of the availability of intelligence information indicating the high likelihood of violence.
We shall conclude this section by discussing whether violence in North Rift was planned or spontaneous with no prior planning, as was the testimony of local administration officials.
This issue is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report. We shall limit ourselves to aspects particular to acts and omissions attributed to the police and the administration in the North Rift.
According to Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu’s district commissioner and the OCPD of Keiyo Division (previously OCPD of Eldoret Division) Angelus Karuru’s testimonies before us, the DSIC was prepared for the possibility of pre-election violence, including the likelihood of some celebratory violence after the election in Uasin Gishu.
However, they did not anticipate widespread post-election violence, had not developed contingency plans for it, and had not beefed up their existing force of 600 police officers.
Their testimony to the commission was nevertheless that they were ready even though when the violence erupted they were forced to call in reinforcements from Baringo, West Pokot and Nairobi for contingents of GSU, the Anti-Stock Unit, the Administrative Police (AP), and some military personnel.
A resident of Langas Estate in Eldoret told commission investigators that the police there were generally ineffective and unable to control roving gangs which surrounded the estate until the police commissioner arrived by helicopter with GSU reinforcements.
That view has the support of a local religious leader who asserted that the security forces were powerless against the violence and furthermore there were ethnic divisions amongst them.
Once reinforced, the district used its forces to unblock the main arteries and to disperse the gangs of young Kalenjin attackers in town and elsewhere.
In conjunction with the DC’s office they also assisted victims by bringing them to IDP camps which initially were established in the area at the ASK Showground in Eldoret, in the Mau Forest and in Mathare.
Later they took the initiative to move them out of hostile rural areas when they received intelligence that Kalenjin warriors were planning to attack and evict IDPs from the camps themselves.
The commission was given evidence that the police were obviously overwhelmed by criminal gangs who proceeded in large numbers and appeared to plan their attacks.
Roadblocks were manned and security forces and health care providers denied free movement. This hampered the police’s ability to rescue distressed victims of the attacks.
The first time district officials heard of plans by Kalenjin youth to attack the Kiambaa farm, for instance, was during a DSIC meeting on 31 December 2007. According to the OCPD, his office immediately dispatched officers to the area.
However, because the access road was heavily blocked with rocks and old tractors at the turnoff to Kiambaa on the Nakuru-Eldoret road, they could not proceed. By the time they arrived the church at Kiambaa had been burned to the ground, with the charred remains of the victims still inside.
In some cases, police on rescue missions faced not just roadblocks but also attacks by hostile gangs of Kalenjin youths.
The commission heard of an incident in which five policemen in a Landrover on a mission to assist an old Kikuyu man at Soi encountered heavy roadblocks from Huruma to Turbo and from Huruma up to Kitale.
They were repelled by gangs of youth armed with bows and arrows, and had to return later to rescue him. A similar situation ensued at Mailu Nne on 31 December 2007. In still other cases, the police themselves were overwhelmed, attacked and even killed.
Beyond this the police took two pre-emptive measures which may have helped to minimise the violence.
First, the OCPD for Uasin Gishu, Angelus Karuru, asked all five petrol stations in town to stop selling small amounts of petrol to individuals as opposed to legitimate motorists. He was acting on intelligence that petrol might have been used to set Kikuyu and Kisii houses on fire.
Second, upon receiving intelligence of possible attacks on IDP camps that had been set up in areas where there had been violence, also mentioned in NSIS’ intelligence reports, he immediately deployed forces and vehicles to have them moved to safety in town as did some officials in the provincial administration in other parts of the North Rift.
As witness number 86 from Chegaiya sub location who had lost all his family members and who testified before the commission noted: “We remained in the Administration Police camp for four days. The attackers continued to attack us, even in the camp. The Kalenjin officers in the camp joined their kinsmen in the attacks and the Kikuyu Administration Police officer had to take rifles from them.”
On the other hand, there were numerous reports of the police and other security forces being heavy-handed and even worse.
During the violence they chased a group of demonstrators near the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret and in the process lobbed both tear gas and fired bullets into the hospital.
The DC for Uasin Gishu, testifying before the commission, denied that this had happened, saying that the tear gas must have been a by-product of what was used outside the hospital.
However, both the head of the hospital and its guards told the commission that the police tried to enter the hospital by force. Cross-examination revealed that both canisters and bullet casings were found inside the hospital, the OCPD admitting in his testimony that it was possible that, in fact, tear gas and bullets were fired into the hospital.
The commission also received evidence of numerous other instances of police brutality. Witnesses spoke under oath of horrifying tales of police brutality and indifference.
This included police standing by, doing nothing and not coming to the assistance of individuals and communities under attack, joining in the attacks, including raping already vulnerable victims, and taunting Kikuyu victims with one of Kibaki’s campaign slogans “kazi iendelee ” (let the work continue) as they stood by watching helpless victims being attacked.
In other cases, there were reports of victims under attack seeking police help and being turned away. Among many cases, the commission was able to determine that a senior police officer in Eldoret was responsible for personally shooting a number of individuals.
The commission visited one such victim at a hospital where he had been admitted with wounds sustained from gun fire. Similar allegations were made in the evidence produced by the KNCHR.
The commission was told that some chiefs either passively or actively collaborated with the attackers.
At least 13 of them were later interdicted after reports against them were made. In his sworn testimony, the district commissioner of Uasin Gishu, Bernard Kinyua, admitted to having “received some information that the chiefs were not helpful” and “were not there for the people”, although he claimed that he had no information that chiefs were involved in the violence, nor were any names given in the intelligence reports he received.
However, evidence received by the commission tells disturbing stories of chiefs either standing by while violence was being committed, or even actively taking part in the commission of violent acts.
A Kikuyu pastor from Burnt Forest had this to say: “The young Kalenjin men started attacking and shouting that the non-Kalenjin had to go. We tried telephoning the OCS Burnt Forest station and the chief countless times. Nothing happened.
“Kikuyu young men started trying to defend themselves. There was no response. The chief arrived with his two police officers who were both Kalenjin. The AP officers started pushing the Kikuyu men back as the Kalenjin men burnt houses behind them. Everyone was pushed to the centre of the Kikuyu farm.”
Moreover, a resident of Kiambaa who testified to the commission in private submitted as an exhibit a memorandum from “residents of Uasin Gishu”, identifying by name eight chiefs from “one ethnic group”, whom they claim had fuelled tribal clashes in 1992 and 1997, who had been threatening “people from other communities with eviction during the referendum in 2005”, and were “frustrating” the return of those who were evicted from Burnt Forest and Ainabkoi.
In short, while not denying many instances where police mobilised quickly to assist victims to quell the violence or where they were overwhelmed, the commission also has evidence that in some other cases victims of post-election violence found the very people they thought would help and defend them as they were under attack participating in the violence themselves or indifferent to their plight.
Under these circumstances, it is not so surprising that many victims of post-election violence chose not to make reports to the police.
This in itself was another part of the tragic breakdown of law and order and indicative of the lack of integrity of key Government institutions, including the security forces. It is also a pattern that supports previous findings from the Akiwumi Report.
The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee (PSIC) and the District Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) each contributed intelligence information concerning security in Kenya before, during and after the election.
Before the election, the NSIS correctly analysed the forces at work in the country and said that in the case of either a Kibaki or Odinga loss there was a strong possibility of post-election violence, the worst case scenario being if the ODM candidate lost.
Some of the pre-election intelligence received by the commission from the three agencies predicted the post-election violence which engulfed the North Rift, particularly in Uasin Gishu District.
The NSIS’ situation and hot spot analy2sis from June 2007 until February 2008, given to the commission, mostly concentrates on traditional conflict areas such as Trans-Nzoia, Molo and other parts of the Rift and on gangs such as Mungiki operating there and elsewhere.
As early as three months before the elections, the NSIS warned in its Situation Report of September 25, 2007, that “in parts of Uasin Gishu, tension is brewing between the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and the Kisii following the Mugirango skirmishes with some Kalenjin tribesmen terming the two communities their political enemies and threatening to evict them.
It added however with some premonition that “violence could engulf different parts of the country if cases of incitement are not legally addressed as they emerge.”
In its “Hot Spot/Flash Point” Report of October 19, 2007, the NSIS noted that the debate around Majimbo was already being used by some politicians in Nairobi, Rift Valley and Coast provinces scheming and organising local youth to attack perceived outsiders in order to disenfranchise them and finally have the incident blamed on Majimbo campaigns.
NSIS added that “generally, the debate has elicited a strong anti-Kikuyu sentiment due to the fact that the community is also robustly opposed to the system.”
The same briefing under the heading “Use of Criminal Gangs” noted that as the campaigns intensify, the possibility of various leaders/politicians resorting to reactivation and use of such gangs was likely in Nairobi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Gusiiland, Kuria and parts of Central Province.
On November 23, 2007, NSIS noted that in Uasin Gishu District, “tension is looming between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu within Timboroa area following the arrest of two members of the Kikuyu community for circulating anti-ODM leaflets.”
And on December 7, 2007, NSIS warned that in Nandi North, the Nandi and Luhya could clash at Os-Rongai area in Turbo division where Nandi tribesmen torched houses belonging to Luhya to avenge the killing of a Nandi over alleged theft of property.
It is unclear from what the Commission has received and from its examination of the intelligence reports from Uasin Gishu District whether the NSIS’s analysis, and in particular its two case scenarios were communicated downward to the provinces and the districts or not, and why if the violence was planned and organised, the NSIS either did not have this information or did not transmit it to the field. Both the DC and the OCPD for Uasin Gishu testified to the Commission that they did not receive any information about NSIS’s two scenarios or potential problems if ODM did not win.
However, the NSIS Uasin Gishu District Coordinator who testified in camera passed on some intelligence information to the DSIC about the possibility of pre-election violence in Kesses as early as October 30, 2007.
Furthermore, he also generated a security brief on December 29, 2007 which went to the DSIC stating that “tension was high within Uasin Gishu district and that there was a likelihood of violence targeting the Kikuyu community in a number of specifically designated spots in the following divisions: Soy, Kesses, Turbo, Kapsaret, Eldoret Town, and Ainabkoi.”
Nevertheless, most officials from the North Rift, including the DC for Uasin Gishu who chaired the above December 29, DSIC meeting as well as the OCPD for Eldoret, and other officials testifying before the Commission said they did not anticipate post-election violence.
The Commission finds it surprising that provincial administration officials would not anticipate some level of post-election violence while they were aware that the pre-election period had been extremely tense, filled with incendiary language, hate speech, innuendoes concerning majimboism and the possibility of evicting outsiders, pamphlets threatening war, and scattered references to politicians encouraging their supporters to “violate the law.”
Having survived the 2005 referendum on the constitution without incident and having completed what turned out to be a peaceful December 2007 election, including the announcement of the parliamentary results on December 27 and 28, officials did not think there would be serious problems after the election, leave alone anticipate the debacle that engulfed the country.
As Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu District Commissioner noted, he had been extremely vigilant and had intensified patrols before the election in areas that had experienced pre-election violence in the past such as Yamumbi, Turbo, and Burnt Forest, but he did not anticipate that violence could be on the scale on which it happened.
He explained in his testimony to the Commission that previously nothing like this ever happened, adding that in the past, immediately after elections were over, people would settle down to [their] daily business, but this time it was the reverse.
He said he had covered the district properly and thought he could handle any situation, adding, however, that in this case it was “enormous”, “nothing like what we expected,” and “spontaneous.”
Nevertheless, he admitted that because of the utterances of some politicians, he was aware that there was an expectation of an ODM win and that there might be a refusal to accept anything else.
However, he said he did not receive any information from the NSIS or other agencies of unprecedented upheavals if ODM did not win. This partly contradicts the intelligence information said to have been relayed to the DSIC on December 29, 2007.
Notwithstanding this reality and similar sentiments conveyed from other officials both in Uasin Gishu District and in other parts of the North Rift there were reports of violence in the run up to the election indicative of heightened tensions, as well as isolated attacks on businesses and burning of houses on farms even before the ECK announced the presidential results on December 30.
This included three houses allegedly having been burned in Lelmorok farm in Kesses on December 29, an incident about which the OCPD said he was not aware, but which a resident who had been evicted four times previously, confirmed when he testified to the Commission in camera, also naming some of those he alleged to be the attackers.
Furthermore, a former resident of Outspan Estate in Eldoret, said the chaos there began as early as December 27, causing her to take refuge in a church during the evening. In her statement to the Commission she said that “Kalenjins started burning houses belonging to the Kikuyus on December 28.”
On December 29, while checking on her property, she was then accosted and raped by three men. Evidence submitted to the Commission by KNCHR also maintained that some Kikuyus buried their possessions before the election in anticipation of attacks. Kikuyus had already left the area between December 27 and 29 to ensure their safety.
In addition, the DC of Uasin Gishu and the OCPD of Eldoret Division noted that some public service vehicles stopped coming to town as early as December 24 because of allegations that they were ferrying marked ballots.
There were also widespread allegations of rigging. In spite of these incidents, it is not apparent that either administrative officials or police refined their intelligence as a result, nor apparently was there any sense of the unexpected impending disaster to follow.
Furthermore, a witness from Nandi Hills told the Commission that “there were already tyres being burned on the road from Nandi Hills to Kisumu” as of December 26.
Angelus Karuru, OCPD for Eldoret Division during the election, told the Commission there were four incidents before the election which he had effectively contained, something that gave him confidence about handling whatever might come up during and after the election.
There was a shooting incident on November 17, 2007 at Cheptiret Secondary School during the ODM’s parliamentary and civic nominations when 200 of the party’s supporters blocked the highway to the tallying centre, using logs, big stones, and their own motor vehicles.
The second was at Ziwa Sirikwa Trading Centre on November 27, 2007 when 100 ODM youth disrupted a PNU political rally.
The third was on December 26, 2007 when local politicians and foreign press stormed the divisional headquarters to inspect a Molo Line Company minibus which was alleged falsely, it turned out, to have brought administration police and ballot boxes to be used to rig the election.
Finally, on the same day in the early evening at Keiyo Petrol Station, youths burned a pick-up truck transferring ballots from Keiyo Division to Kaptubei polling centre, but the police moved in swiftly to rescue the ballots. They also contained the other incidents, but no one was arrested, a point that was criticised under cross examination as having contributed to a culture of impunity.
Apart from the lack of anticipation of what might follow, the testimony by the DC for Uasin Gishu and the OCPD for Eldoret suggests that neither followed up on local intelligence and information they knew about.
Had they taken the initiative to do so, they might have pre-empted some of the violence which was experienced.
It is not clear to the commission if this was because of the lack of capacity or the result of not wanting to tread on the toes of powerful political personalities in the district for fear of retribution, something which had been noted in the Akiwumi Report.
Neither the provincial administration nor the police investigated claims of incitement by politicians or media stations. They claimed they did not know the names of the two prominent athletes who were killed during the post-election violence.
They appeared unwilling to discuss the ethnicity of their staff. They said they did not know or follow up on reports concerning politicians engaged in hostile acts or speech. They claimed they did not have any information on any chiefs or police as having been involved in the violence.
They did not look into the source of hostile leaflets being distributed. They said they did not have reports about which politicians were using the terms “madoadoa ” and “makwekwe ” even though they had “heard about this generally”. They had no information that youths were being trained to engage in violence.
In contrast, a witness told the Commission that the following “threatening terms” were routinely used against Kikuyu: madoadoa (spots), maharagwe (beans), bunyot (enemy), sangara (wild grass) with the additional notation that they should be “uprooted”. When asked if he had followed up on some specific information the OCPD said he had not.
He argued that it was not the function of the police to follow up on general information as opposed to formal reports.
The OCPD said that he “could not rule out that the violence was planned,” but did not have any information to this effect.
Concerning incitement and hate speech he told the Commission that he did not investigate “rumours” and that “you only investigate what has been reported”, noting that “no one came forward to report and say ABCD”.
When asked what he did about allegations that some athletes participated in the post election violence, he said he had heard about it but “no one said so and so was doing ABCD”, a phrase that was repeated several times following questions directed at him when he testified to the Commission.
He also did not formally investigate the incident where the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital was invaded and tear gassed by police, an incident confirmed to the Commission by Jonathan K. Barno, head of the Security Department of the Hospital and Julius K. Chelimo, the Security Supervisor at the hospital, who had tried to dissuade the GSU officer in charge and who described the behaviour of police officers at the hospital as “merciless.”
This attitude of the OCPD is particularly troubling, but may not be so unusual given the testimony of a senior provincial security officer that investigating the post-election violence was extremely difficult given that witnesses were very reluctant to come forward to give evidence for fear of reprisals, something also reiterated by a resident of Nandi Hills.
It is also possible that officials themselves did not want to delve too deeply into matters that might come with the names of prominent people, given that, as an Eldoret resident noted: “In the skirmishes in [the] Rift Valley no leaders from the area condemned the violence”.
As a Kikuyu from Lerumoruk farm in Nandi Hills explained in trying to get the Commission to understand why even the multi ethnic composition of the district administration was not a source of comfort to him and others: “The DO is just two kilometres from the farm but anything can be said, anything can be done with or without him there. We have very powerful people in this district. The politicians here [in Uasin Gishu District] decide what is to be done. It doesn’t matter what you say…”
Furthermore, according to the provincial criminal investigation officer (PCIO), even people like him have difficulty dealing with the “big fish”. As he noted in testimony to the Commission: “My Lord…when you arrest the so-called politicians, people don’t look into the crime. They say the police have arrested one of our own. We arrested some councillors in Buret and the council was so rowdy.
They stormed the whole Buret Police Station so much so that we were compelled to release those councillors.”
In the commission’s view the lack of robust action by the administration officers and the police to pre-empt the possibility of post-election violence can be put down to several factors: complacency after peaceful polling given past history of pre- rather than post-election violence; fatigue because so many officials from both the provincial administration had been up for days either manning polls or counting votes; lack of communication from the NSIS to the field; an unwillingness to act on the of intelligence received, admittedly belatedly, by the DSIC on 29th December; and a “play it safe” attitude on the part of district officials who did not want to rock the boat, particularly given the tendency of powerful politicians to call the shots at the local level and exact retribution, problems reported earlier in the Akiwumi Report.
The commission was informed that in fact the councillors were protesting at the shooting of two civilians by the police when they were arrested. Was the violence planned or spontaneous?
The question whether violence in North Rift was planned or spontaneous has as many answers as there are respondents depending on the respondent’s ethnic or political inclinations. There was also the view of the provincial administration, that the post election violence in Uasin Gishu, indeed in the North Rift in general, was spontaneous, was not planned.
Thus the commission heard testimony in favour of both the view that the violence was planned and organised as well as the view that it was spontaneous.
Those who hold the view that the violence was planned believe that it was a contingency plan on the part of ODM politicians and supporters should the election results go in favour of the PNU.
Those holding the view that the violence was planned and organised cite four factors in support of their view:
(i) testimony that information had spread within communities prior to the violence that the Kalenjin would attempt attacks;
(ii) the testimony of witnesses who say they attended meetings or knew of individuals who were organising violence both before and after the announcement of the presidential results;
(iv) circumstantial evidence pointing in the same direction. We shall now examine these four sources in light of evidence we received.
The commission heard numerous testimonies indicating that advance warnings were given to people in anticipation of the violence.
In most cases, advance warnings are said to have been given to members of the Kikuyu community by their Kalenjin friends, tenants, business partners, or relatives in inter-ethnic marriages.
In other cases, Kalenjin elders or church leaders who disapproved of plans to attack Kikuyu are said to have sent advance warnings to their Kikuyu neighbours, congregation colleagues and friends. Statements collected by the commission investigators are illustrative of some of the warnings had been given to individuals in advance of 30th December, including the following:
“On December 29, I received a telephone call from the wife of the pastor at the AIC Church and she told me that young Kalenjin were planning to attack the Kamuyu farm. On December 30, 2008 immediately after the announcement of the election result, homes began burning around Kamuyu. The young Kalenjin men started attacking and shouting that non-Kalenjin had to go. It all happened at the same time in all the areas in Kamuyu”. (Pastor from Burnt Forest interviewed by CIPEV investigators).
“A few days (before) the election KASS FM announced that there would be rigging and in some of their open forums they encouraged people to use the radio to incite people who gave their views. Most people used the radio to say that whether PNU or ODM [won], Kikuyu would be expelled from Rift Valley. So there was very high tension.”
(NARC activist from Kapseret Location, Uasin Gishu District, interviewed by CIPEV investigators).
Furthermore, a resident of Eldoret town who testified in camera to the commission in Nairobi noted that “from 27 December all my friends from the local community disappeared from town with their families, something that has never happened. On the eve of [the] announcement of Presidential election results, the killings had already begun in outlying areas such as Moiben”.
Most reports from witnesses and others describe large groups of Kalenjin youth blocking roads with felled trees, large boulders, tractors, and the use of petrol to burn dwellings and farms in numerous non-contiguous areas.
For this to have occurred, the invaders needed to have cut down trees, moved heavy rocks, and obtained petrol, all factors which can be argued to point to some level of organisation and planning.
The extent of this depends in part on the amount of petrol used, where and how it was obtained, whether or not chain saws were necessary to fell trees, and what sort of equipment was used to move boulders to create barricades in various parts of the North Rift.
In some other cases, reports describe what appear to have been simultaneously coordinated attacks from different points and the need for transport to have brought attackers from miles away to gathering points.
Although the Kalenjin youth engaging in these acts had a good deal of history to draw on given the violence of the 1990s, the accounts of the violence do not suggest a breakdown of law and order arising solely from spontaneous rioting.
A number of government officials testifying to the commission described the violence as spontaneous. A senior provincial government security officer who testified in camera, told the commission that “[t]his was not organised crime…
[i]t was a spontaneous reaction”. In response to suggestions that officials were reluctant to investigate “the big guys” the same officer said they had followed up, but found there was no concrete evidence. He nevertheless added that “recently we got information …and my officers opened up investigations” into three major political figures whom witnesses named as having been involved in the organisation and training of youth.
Another senior police officer, the former Rift Valley PPO Everett Wasige, after suggesting that Kalenjin don’t need preparation, mentioned that from the Rift Valley PCIO, pattern of attacks there suggested there must have been organised support for attackers in form of transportation, provision of food, etc.
Evidence of such organisation and support appeared clear to him when he explained that “of course to run from one District to another burning and looting, there [must be] supervisors,” and it would be difficult to go around “burning houses, killing people without eating something, without the support…” He also told us about a meeting at the Nairobi police headquarters in which politicians and other Kalenjin leaders were called and told “we have information that you people are inciting your members against other people.” The witness did not tell us whether there was any response from the politicians.
Some of those who hold the view that the violence was spontaneous have sought to explain its scale on the basis of what can be described as Kalenjin cultural disposition towards war.
In testimonies presented to the commission, a number of Kalenjin witnesses and experts used the idea of the so-called Kalenjin culture to argue the violence could attain the level of magnitude it did in North Rift and still be spontaneous; not planned or organised. Variances of the “Kalenjin culture” theory aimed at explaining some cultural predilection of Kalenjins to engage in warfare were offered by a former Rift Valley PPO when answering the question whether violence in North Rift was spontaneous or planned.
He told the commission that the violence was probably spontaneous because “the Kalenjins require just a ... They don’t need to plan. You injure John Kiplangat Arap Koech, a Kalenjin from Tinderet, Nandi South District, who introduced himself as a “Cultural Practitioner and Land Dispute Tribunal elder” and “currently involved in carrying out research on the origin and customs of the Kalenjin”, also resorted to elements of the Kalenjin culture to explain the violence in North Rift.
He emphatically stated that violence was spontaneous and strongly challenged and dismissed as “false and malicious…the notion that the violence was planned, funded and organised.” He explained that “given the nature of the Kalenjin set up and cultural inculcation, when violence develops into a situation akin to war then the entire community rises to defend itself.” Bill Ruto, a writer by profession, said: “The Kalenjins just like many other pastoralist communities tend to be militarily organised and can respond to perceived threats in an organised manner. This rapid and organised reaction is what most people have confused for pre-planning of violence.”
But the “Kalenjin culture” theory as an explanation for the violence in North Rift was strongly challenged by a number of Kalenjin lay members and community leaders.
A Kalenjin religious leader dismissed the theory and instead accused political leaders who come up and use the ethnic background and the unity they found to instil violence, and suggested that to end the cycles of violence we have to break that.
He added that “the same applies to the Maasai because they are all the Nilotic group. So it is the myths that can be changed but it is this unity the politicians are exploiting…”
In his testimony to the Commission, Hon William Ruto also dismissed the Kalenjin culture theory, remarking “there is no DNA for people to fight.” Instead, he blamed the Kalenjin attacks on Kikuyu during the post-election violence on “a combination of factors”, including the history of violence since 1992 with “friction [having been] higher in Uasin Gishu than any other area” because of the cosmopolitan make-up of the district. He dismissed the land issue as a factor in the 2007 violence. He told the Commission, “The issue of the PEV is not land, let nobody cheat you. Kikuyus always sit on the land and the only problem is at the end of five years. It is all politics. Land is just an excuse.”
He also noted that “our politics acquires ethnic dimensions” and communities support parties where “their leaders are at the front and that is one thing we have to change.” He finally remarked that the 2007 election was very polarised and “the people in the Rift Valley believed that Kibaki oppressed them in the past five years. They voted more against Kibaki’s presidency than for Raila’s presidency.”
A Kalenjin businessman concurred with the religious leader, noting: “The issue of Kalenjin warriors does not arise here. To me, those are Kalenjin young men who idle around and anyone can take advantage of them to be warriors. The word “warriors” in the Kalenjin tradition is a respectable term. But nowadays there are no warriors. They have just classified these young men as warriors.
He also added: “People hide behind culture…. This [the post-election violence] is nothing to do with culture,” insisting as well that “land wasn’t an issue either”, but that it was just used to “cover what happened”.
As to the real cause of violence, a Kalenjin resident of Eldoret offered that “the violence was motivated by jealousy” against Kikuyu who had “succeeded in business” as opposed to Luhya and Gusii who also owned land, with the post-election violence being “purely politically motivated”.
In 2007, in contrast to the 1990s the bulk of the violence in the North Rift followed rather than preceded the elections. Explanations offered for the timing and scale of the 2007 post-election violence include: general spontaneous anger by ODM’s Kalenjin candidates and voters at the announcement of a Kibaki win amidst allegations of rigging; land hunger and a desire to evict so-called outsiders whatever the outcome of the elections; and a desire by Kalenjin ODM candidates to overturn the presidential election and assume power.
It is our finding that violence in North Rift caught the police and local administration officials totally unprepared.
We found this particularly disturbing given the fact that intelligence was made (or should have been made) available to local administration and police indicating the high likelihood of violence in either case of the electoral outcome – but higher in the case of a Kibaki win.
As a consequence, police reaction to the violence was chaotic, to say the least.
Some police officers joined the attackers and participated in the violence. Others were able to display acts of personal courage that saved lives. In many cases, the default line was ethnic, along which the police force was divided. In general, though, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of attackers and what appeared to be a fairly high level of organisation of the attacks.
Central Rift Valley is, to a large extent, dominated by the larger Nakuru District whose Kikuyu majority raised a feeling of unease and suspicion among Kalenjin politicians following the end of the one party system in 1992.
They felt that the position of Daniel Arap Moi as President was under threat by the Kikuyu, who were at the forefront of the clamour for multi-party democracy
Thus in this period, the Central Rift experienced a pattern of clashes where the non Kalenjin and non-Maasai tribes were attacked, their houses set on fire and many killed with a view to driving them out of the region since they were perceived not to support the then ruling party Kanu.
Narok was one of the three places in the Rift Valley where the pro-one party rallies were held in 1991 and the key message emanating from these political meetings was that violence would be used to resist multi party politics.
A key architect of this school of thought was William Ole Ntimama, the MP for Narok North who stated that Kanu leaders had resolved to fight together and follow President Moi in the clamour to end the debate for multi party politics by use of majimbo as the antidote against the reintroduction of plural politics.
The larger Nakuru district, due to its high Kikuyu population, was the hardest hit by the tribal clashes that came to be associated with the region from 1991 to 1998. Of note is that the larger Nakuru District was later split to create Molo, Naivasha, Rongai and Subukia Districts.
For purposes of this Report, the Central Rift Valley covers the following districts; Narok, Molo, Koibatek, Nakuru, Rongai and Naivasha districts.
While Nakuru, Molo and Naivasha Districts have a clear Kikuyu majority, Narok is predominantly Maasai, while Koibatek has a clear Kalenjin majority.
In Rongai, the population between Kalenjin and Kikuyu is almost even with a slight margin in favour of the Kalenjin.
The rationale for dealing with the region separately was informed by the fact that it has been a theatre of internecine ethnic conflict that first erupted in 1991 after the re-introduction of multi party politics. Further, it is a cosmopolitan and strategic region which has attracted heavy focus from different political parties seeking to hold sway.
Nakuru Town, a highly multiethnic town is Kenya’s fourth largest town and the administrative capital of the entire Rift Valley Province.
The politics of the region have been extremely competitive and volatile, no doubt informed by the fact that this zone, having once formed part of the former white highlands saw different ethnic communities purchase land under various settlement schemes, some of which were set up prior to Independence.
As noted in the Akiwumi Report, “the different tribes in this area only tolerated each other as there were deep seated ethnic ambitions and prejudices which were activated by political events preceding the 1992 General Elections”.
While political realignments had shifted in 2007 — the Kalenjin and Maasai expressing support this time round for the ODM and not Kanu, nevertheless, the patterns of violence in 2007 closely echoed what had transpired previously with slight differences, i.e. the use of criminal gangs suspected to be Mungiki by the Kikuyu in Nakuru and Naivasha ostensibly to protect the Kikuyu community and largely Kalenjin gangs in turn preparing to attack the Kikuyu in Nakuru, but this time without the tacit support of the state security machinery that had hitherto aided their cause in the 1990s.
We received evidence on violence in Molo District during our hearings in Nakuru and Eldoret. We also made site visits to Njoro and Kuresoi and interacted with a number of officials from the local police, provincial administration and citizens.
The visit provided a unique opportunity for the Commission to witness first hand some of the scenes affected by violence and hear additional explanation from eye witnesses.
Commission investigators also recorded statements and depositions from displaced persons from Molo and Kuresoi and these accounts have been in turn amply supported by District Security Intelligence Committee minutes and 80 also published reports by other entities including public bodies. The totality of such information pieces together the story of Molo and Kuresoi.
Molo District borders the Mau Forest, which is one of Kenya’s largest forest areas comprising about 36 per cent of the total forest cover in the country.
The region is situated along the Mau Escarpment and is one of the most fertile farmlands in the country famous for growing pyrethrum, potatoes and other agricultural crops due to its cool climate.
The district, on the other hand, has also been a theatre of ethnic based conflict since the return of multi party politics in 1991.
The Akiwumi Commission noted that in the then Nakuru District, Molo and Olenguruone Divisions (parts of the current Molo District) were the most affected by 1992-1993 clashes and that Molo Division was among the few areas declared security operation zones under the Preservation of Public Security Act.48 The district has two constituencies —Kuresoi (with a Kalenjin majority, a sizeable number of Kikuyu and a Kisii minority) and Molo (with a largely Kikuyu majority and Kalenjin and Kisii minority).
Both constituencies also host a number of other communities mainly the Ogiek (an indigenous hunter/gatherer community), Luhya and Luo communities.
The Akiwumi report further noted in its findings that this ethnic diversity had been a source of tension and ethnic conflict pitting the Kalenjin on the one hand and the Kikuyu and Kisii on the other.
Evidence tendered by the KNCHR also notes that the area experienced ethnic violence in 1992 and 1997 where the pattern of attacks was Kalenjin raiders attacking and killing members of the Kikuyu community and burning their houses and in turn the Kikuyu community organising themselves to launch counter attacks in which they killed the Kalenjin and also burnt their homes.
A witness testified that Kuresoi Constituency was carved out of the old Molo constituency in such a way that the majority of the people in Kuresoi were Kalenjin.
The witness claimed that this was influenced by retired President Daniel Arap Moi to ensure that the Kalenjin in that constituency could get a representative in Parliament because a Kalenjin candidate could not win in the bigger Molo due to the large Kikuyu majority.
This history of ethnic tensions in Molo District was confirmed by the Rift Valley PC Hassan Noor Hassan who stated that since 1992, elections had been the excuse rather than the cause for the violence over land.
Other witnesses, however, provided a broader perspective of the reasons for ethnic infighting notably Gordon Ogolla, Chairman of the Rift Valley Chapter of the Law Society who gave a number of causes; firstly that violence was not over land as such, but rather due to a feeling among the Kalenjin that during elections, the Kikuyu and other communities opted not to vote according to the wishes of the Kalenjin and instead followed the voting patterns of their kinsmen elsewhere which general feeling led to animosity between the communities, and secondly in the areas of Nesuit, Mauche and some places around Njoro, the biggest problem appeared to be centered, not on politics, but on allocation of the Mau Forest in the 1990s to senior Government officials and well connected individuals, which enraged the Ogiek community who consider the Western Mau Forest to be their ancestral home.
During cross examination of Mr Ogolla on the issue of the democratic rights of citizens to vote as they wished, he stated that the issue of voting patterns in the Rift Valley where there were mixed communities — Kikuyus, Kisiis, Luhyas, Luos and the Kalenjin — elicited feelings among Kalenjin that non-Kalenjin communities tended to follow the political trends from their ancestral areas of Nyanza, Western and Central provinces, which had antagonised the Kalenjin since the return of multi party politics, hence a feeling that if non-Kalenjins wished to live harmoniously among the Kalenjin, then the Kalenjin expected them to vote together with them and not with the regions where they were deemed to have come from.
He did, however, concede that while such a proposition was patently undemocratic, it nevertheless had the potential to realise inter- ethnic coexistence in the province.
Not surprisingly, Mr Ogolla was of the view that failure to heed the recommendations of the Akiwumi, Kiliku and Ndung’u reports had contributed to the violence.
