The night in 2007 when Kibaki almost threw in towel

It was at night. And the two lonely souls at State House, Nairobi, could only watch as the results of the 2007 elections trickled in. President Mwai Kibaki was with Francis Muthaura, the Head of Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet, and each was lost in their own thoughts. Everyone else had left, and outside, the State House grounds were deadly silent.

An election that pitted Mwai Kibaki against Raila Odinga, the leader of the Orange Democratic Movement, was about to end his political career. President Kibaki spoke little – and the much Muthaura could offer was comfort.

On Tuesday morning, on November 6, 2012, and for three hours, I sat with Mr Muthaura at his dining room in Rongai as I listened to this story that was to form part of Mwai Kibaki’s photo-biography, for which I was tasked to interview his close friends and write the manuscript. He spoke candidly about that night – when he watched Raila take the lead.

“(As) the gap continued to widen, I told the President that our field officers have told us not to worry since the PNU strongholds had not announced their results yet,” recalled Muthaura.

Kibaki’s Party of National Unity, was facing a herculean task and both him and Muthaura could see. “At one point, Odinga opened a gap with a million votes.” All through, President Kibaki did not panic – and unknown to many, he was prepared to go home if he was declared the loser.

Muthaura looked at the silent Kibaki.

“I told him that his record of performance as President in infrastructure development is all there to be seen… He just told me: ‘There is everything to show,” recalled Muthaura.

Resigned to electoral fate

As Muthaura explained the events of that night, I was only wondering how lonely it was at the top. At one point, as more results came in, it looked unlikely that President Kibaki would beat Odinga in the race. Mr Muthaura looked at Kibaki again and there was little he could do – and it appeared that the president had resigned to the electoral fate.

“I started counselling him,” Muthaura said. “I hoped I could offer him some help.” But certainly, there was little that they could do that night.

“Was he pained by the results?” I asked Muthaura, trying to trigger back his memory.

“He did not speak much. I told him that this was like a repeat of 2005 (the year Kibaki lost the referendum on a new constitution) and that people had just ganged up against Mt Kenya region.”

It was the best, perhaps, that Muthaura could offer that night. It was mostly a monologue. Apart from the TV election jingles and the intermittent announcements, Mr Muthaura did not know the pain Kibaki was going through. “He just told me: “There is everything to show.” And then he went quiet.

Never stole any election

At this point, I didn’t wish to interject. Muthaura was now speaking in a low tone and a firm voice: “Kibaki never stole any election and neither did he tell anyone to steal. I was with him that night,” said Muthaura, who would later be falsely accused of planning post-election violence that followed Kibaki’s victory.

It was after votes from PNU strongholds started trickling in that the ODM claimed that there was rigging.

“I told Kibaki that we need to talk to the media for the stability of the country. It was a very tense moment,” and he said, “Go and talk to them.”

“Kibaki told me that the media was key to holding the country together and we had a meeting with media owners and senior editors. We returned to State House and there was an overnight recount at KICC, which all parties had agreed to abide by. These were the results that enabled Electoral Commission chairman Samuel Kivuitu to announce the results,” recalled Muthaura.

With Kivuitu’s announcement that Kibaki had won, the task of swearing him in fell on Mr Muthaura.

“I remember I was with Raphael Tuju, Chief Justice Evans Gicheru and Attorney-General Amos Wako when we made the decision to swear-in Kibaki that day. Initially, we had thought of having an elaborate ceremony, but due to the crisis that was unfolding, we thought that a power vacuum would encourage power struggle. And since the electoral commission had announced the results, we invited diplomats to State House to come and witness the swearing-in. It was not at night. But that was the best way to save the country.”

Operating without a Cabinet

For one week, as the country went through post-election violence, Kibaki was operating without a Cabinet.

“There was a lot of pressure on him with VIPs and Heads of State calling to help resolve the crisis. In private and public, the president had said he wanted an all-embracing Cabinet in order to restore peace. We advised him to pick a skeletal Cabinet to help him absorb the pressure. He needed a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Finance minister and a Special Programmes minister. Kibaki agreed to this proposal.”

Initially, it had been thought that Kibaki was giving the prime jobs to PNU even as the talks were going on. “We were not giving PNU prime jobs. Those were jobs to help us deal with the crisis,” Muthaura said.

All this time, Kibaki did not show signs of panic: “He knew that at the end of the day, the buck stops with him. He never failed when he was required to make a decision. The good thing with Kibaki is that if you gave him advice, he owned it and would never apportion blame if it failed. One thing he knew was that the security of the country was intact. It’s sad we lost people, but at no time was the Kenyan nation under threat. The international community blew the crisis out of proportion.”

During Kibaki’s presidency, Muthaura was “Mr Everything” and is credited for putting order into government. He would recall how Kibaki accepted the 2005 referendum defeat with so much ease that he (Muthaura) was surprised.

When the country was voting for a new constitution in 2005 – when he led the Yes team against Orange (for No) – Kibaki didn’t return to Nairobi after voting in Nyeri. After the electoral commission announced that the No team had won, it was Muthaura who picked the call that morning and asked the president to return to State House and accept the results.

“Initially, he had planned to return in the afternoon. I was very demoralised and I remember him telling me: ‘You should not be too low… That matter is concluded.’ I was surprised that Kibaki appeared to be in high spirits, and that helped us a lot. He came to Nairobi that morning and addressed the nation. I was happy about that.”

Here are the unpublished excerpts of the November 6, 2012 interview.

When did you meet Kibaki?

I first heard of Kibaki in 1960. He was always in the news as the Kanu executive officer. We were in high school then and some of the names admired were Kibaki, Tom Mboya and Julius Gikonyo Kiano.

But I first met Kibaki in 1967 when I was in Nyeri High School while in Form Five and as a member of the Economics Club. Kibaki – as the Minister for Commerce – had already launched a campaign “Buy Kenya, Build Kenya, and we all liked the concept. He was very impressed with our club.

My initial impression of Kibaki was that of a sharp, knowledgeable and confident politician. When I joined the provincial administration in 1972, Kibaki was already a Finance minister and was deemed one of the best.

I came to admire him during the Budget of 1975. This is the time he said that the soft options have ended. He wanted to protect the local industries. It was him who came up with import substitution policies that helped the local industrial sector expand.

I first met and interacted with Kibaki officially as a government officer in 1986 when I was working as a diplomat. Kibaki had come to an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Addis Ababa. I was to brief him as vice-president and he was together with Foreign Affairs minister Elijah Mwangale on issues that were to be discussed by the Council of Ministers. What surprised me that time was that he was alone and he had not come with any staff from Nairobi. I found this strange but didn’t ask him why he was alone.

There was a time you almost lost your job for speaking to Kibaki.

Yes. When I was appointed Kenyan ambassador to the European Economic Community (1988 -1993). I met Kibaki, by accident, as I was heading home to see my ailing father. Kibaki was the chairman of Democratic Party (DP) and he was leading a (parliamentary) delegation from Washington DC. I went to his cabin and wanted to greet him as the Kenyan ambassador in Brussels.

Somebody reported me to Nairobi that I was about to join DP and that my father was not sick. That time I almost lost my job and some security agents were sent to my rural home to verify whether my father had been sick. I didn’t meet him again until October 1999 when he came to attend President Julius Nyerere’s funeral when I was the East African Community secretary-general.

Were you surprised that he retained you as permanent secretary – even after working with the Kanu government?

As PS in the Ministry of Environment in 2002, I was preparing to go home after Kanu was removed from power. I thought we were winding up and I called Dr Sally Kosgey (then Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet) asking her whether we should resign. She told us to hold on. The same day I called her, I heard an announcement that I had been appointed PS, Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security.

My minister was Dr Chris Murungaru. But after only one month, I was transferred to the Office of the President as Permanent Secretary, Head of the Public Service, and Secretary to the Cabinet. Until this time, I had not met Kibaki since our meeting in Arusha. This was a surprise because I was a senior member of Moi’s government.

Tell me about your initial meeting...

I met him after I was appointed to the Office of the President and he told me he was very happy to work with me and that I was free to go and see him in State House any time I wanted. This surprised me because I had not known him much [and] I had been in the previous government.

What was different in his style of leadership?

Kibaki was a very detailed man. There were times I’d go to ask him a question and get embarrassed. What I found interesting about him is that he insisted on written briefs before any meeting. He also wanted all the original letters plus any other attachments. And once you gave him these documents, you had to have copies because it was very difficult to retrieve written materials from him.

So, every time I went to see him, I carried two copies. He did this to have his own records. Again if you were going to brief him, you had to be clear and straightforward. In any briefing, Kibaki didn’t talk about other people. He hate(d) gossip and respect(ed) line of authority. He would always be happy to be briefed by his minister and permanent secretary. That way, he could hold people accountable. I realised Kibaki would get impatient if he didn’t get an answer to a query. Those who worked with him know one rule — never go back to him without an answer or with a shoddy answer. Although he [didn’t] exhibit emotions, you could see him becoming impatient.

Food security and education were top of his agenda...

This was one of the hardest briefs. We could brief him for hours assuring him that all was well, but he was never satisfied with our answers. This was the most difficult brief I ever faced. He always had his figures and we would go on and on. Another brief that would keep us on our toes was education. The president used to monitor the enrolment of children. He took it personally for he knew the value of education. He used to tell us: “Primary school education haitoshi… (it’s not enough.)”

How did he work with PSs and other executives?

Kibaki (was) a believer in delegation of authority. Once he gave an assignment, he wanted to see the results. He wouldn’t give you direction on whom to employ or work with. He would give all the executives a free hand to make decisions. That is why we even came up with appraisals to enhance performance.

How did he handle matters at the Cabinet?

Kibaki would not rush things. He allowed everybody to be heard. If somebody wasn’t happy with a particular paper, it would have to be brought again until everybody was in agreement. He allowed comments to improve a particular paper. Inside the cabinet, it (was) hard to know who (was) from which side of the coalition [government].

What was the nature of appointments with the president?

Kibaki was very particular with appointments booked and they were not on a first-come, first-served basis. He accepted them on the basis of importance and on the weight of the brief. A lot of people made this mistake and thought that we were shielding the president. For instance, a minister for Finance and Foreign affairs would get to Kibaki very easily. He had absolutely no time for appointments for casual talk and gossip.

Do you recall him getting annoyed?

He could really get disturbed when people were not honest. I think it’s because he was an honest person and that is why he got uneasy when people distorted facts. He wouldn’t show it in public, but he could lose his temper when he heard people distort issues when addressing the public.

How would one make Kibaki happy?

If you wanted to see him happy, complete a good project. He was, for instance, passionate about the Lamu port and always said it would open the economy of this country.

How was the decision to kick out rebels within the government reached after the failed referendum?

Immediately after Kibaki addressed the nation after losing the referendum, he asked me to call a leaders meeting of various parties allied to PNU to forge the way ahead. That meeting was chaired by vice-president Moody Awori. Others in the meeting were Simeon Nyachae and George Saitoti. One of the options on the table was to dissolve the cabinet and we went to him with that as the verdict. We didn’t know how he would react. When he was told about that option he simply said, “Yes, we are doing that..!”

What was the most difficult task you saw him handle?

That was during the post-election violence negotiations. At one point, it was difficult for the two parties to agree. His side had refused to agree on a 50-50 formula and he took it over himself.

He told them: We can’t talk indefinitely. That was on February 28 and the cabinet was finally sworn-in in April.