Whatever Jimi Wanjigi might lack, cash and political influence are none of them.
In the last two general elections, Mr Wanjigi was the man pulling the strings, and from behind the scenes, in the tricky negotiations on the coalitions for candidates eyeing the presidency.
As a result, and as a power-broker, Mr Wanjigi earned foes and admirers alike in the business and political circles.
JW, as he is fondly known, is back and may influence the nature of coalitions that will emerge for the 2022 contest, especially in Mt Kenya region where various billionaires bankroll party politics.
“I will be in the race…,” he told the Nation in a short text message when asked to confirm his entry.
How this entry will rock the politics is unclear for now. The Nation has been investigating his role in previous polls, painting the picture of a shrewd schemer and power broker with tentacles that run deep, at times to intelligence circles.
In the last General Election, Mr Wanjigi was always beside presidential candidate Raila Odinga, and was the brains behind the management of his campaign. His official position was Resource Mobiliser — though he was thought to be the man bankrolling the National Super Alliance (Nasa), a coalition that had brought together Mr Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Kalonzo Musyoka’s Wiper Democratic Movement (WDM), Moses Wetang’ula’s Ford-Kenya (Ford-K) and Musalia Mudavadi’s Amani National Congress (ANC).
Wealthy, scheming and calculating, the city billionaire has been a silent kingmaker in the country, always matching politicians with plots and sub-plots in their quest to acquire political power and, perhaps, in his personal quest for relevance.
At the moment, only Deputy President William Ruto can match Mr Wanjigi’s wallet in bankrolling campaigns and in having a loyal band of operatives. Both are teetotallers, nocturnal, and openly display their religious convictions.
For a person who has never been in elective politics, Mr Wanjigi’s decision to go for the top seat will complicate the politics in the Mt Kenya region; already divided by the vacuum left by President Kenyatta’s imminent departure and with the entry of DP Ruto who, at the moment, commands a huge chunk of the region.
Whether the DP will retain his block in Mt Kenya region will depend on how Mr Wanjigi manages the politics and the politicians — something he has done previously.
As a life member of ODM, insiders say that Mr Wanjigi is not planning to move out of the party, but whether or not he takes on Mr Odinga for the ticket, looks like a long shot. If, however, Mr Odinga decides to hang his political boots, then Mr Wanjigi’s candidature will depend on how he manages the ODM delegates system.
Mr Wanjigi has been in the thick of Kenyan politics ever since he joined the Kibaki campaign in 2002 and in a race that pitted his St Mary’s schoolmate, Mr Kenyatta, against the former Finance minister.
While he was overshadowed during Kibaki’s first term by the old money billionaires of central Kenya, he was instrumental in connecting the Grand Coalition Government with the Chinese contractors, China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), which had agreed to carry out the standard gauge railway feasibility study at their own cost. But with the Rift Valley Railways (RVR) placing hurdles on the Chinese, it was Mr Wanjigi who approached Mr Odinga, then the Prime Minister, to unlock the stalemate that gave CRBC the greenlight to carry out the feasibility study.
As Kenya was recovering from the 2007 post-election violence, Mr Wanjigi had counted on Prime Minister Raila Odinga to save the SGR project. Having brokered the Chinese contract that led to the building of the Thika Superhighway, Mr Wanjigi had cast his eyes on bigger infrastructure projects.
So connected was Mr Wanjigi that he was instrumental in the Sh1.5 billion grant from China and which saw CRBC build an additional lane from JKIA to Nyayo stadium and improve the road to Gigiri, the Unep headquarters.
But the SGR did not go as he had projected — and as a businessman, he was almost burning his fingers, and his fortunes, as Kibaki delayed implementing the project and as focus turned to succession politics, the new Constitution, Kofi Annan and whether Kenya should form a local tribunal to prosecute the ringleaders of the post-election violence.
On December 10, 2010, the International Criminal Court prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo named the six Kenyans who would face trial — either in Kenya or at the ICC for being behind the post-election violence. They included Mr Ruto, Mr Kenyatta and Industrialisation minister Henry Kosgey.
Others were secretary to the Cabinet Francis Muthaura, former police chief Mohamed Hussein Ali and radio presenter Joshua Arap Sang.
By this time, Mr Wanjigi was not with Mr Odinga. Instead, he was sweet-talking both Mr Kenyatta, then a deputy prime minister, and Mr Ruto, who had fallen out with Mr Odinga, to accept a local tribunal.
As various camps were crafted in a bid to succeed President Kibaki, Mr Odinga was toying with the idea of picking Chirau Ali Mwakwere as his running mate while Mr Kenyatta was thinking of Mr Eugene Wamalwa — in the hope he would secure a chunk of Western Kenya votes.
But then, there was Prof George Saitoti who was being fronted by Mr Wanjigi as a compromise candidate — in case the other dynamics failed.
Unlike the other candidates, Saitoti had the money and as the Party of National Unity (PNU) chairman, the former mathematics professor-turned-politician was second-in-command in the political vehicle Kibaki had used to campaign in the controversial 2007 elections.
A rather lukewarm politician, Saitoti complemented his lack of charisma and aloof persona with the networks he had built over the years as Moi’s vice-president.
As a politician, Saitoti had not been tainted by the tribal politics and had built a political base among the Maasai, though his parents were from Kiambu. This time, according to insiders, he was being asked to admit his parentage first.
Whether this was an accident or sabotage was never known. However, Saitoti’s death changed the Kibaki succession matrix. The death not only marked the end of PNU, but also left open the race to succeed President Kibaki.
Elsewhere, some State House insiders, including President Kibaki’s private secretary, Nick Wanjohi, had brought in Musalia Mudavadi as a potential candidate and financed the Amani Coalition.
“He did not feature anywhere in the activities or records of the party,” Mr Mudavadi says in his autobiography, while admitting that “there were quite a number of people behind the formation of UDF (United Democratic Party).”
UDF was floated to Mr Mudavadi by a person he trusted — then-Mandera Central MP Abdikadir Mohammed. Most likely, he did not know the full story. But as Mr Musyoka wrote in his autobiography, fear that the country would face diplomatic isolation with dire economic consequences — if Kenyatta and Ruto were elected — had led to this attempt by some of Kibaki’s allies to push Mudavadi as a compromise candidate.
At a meeting that was hosted by Mr Wanjigi at the compound of his Kwacha offices in Westlands, a plot was laid on how to politicise the International Criminal Court (ICC) desire to prosecute the group by holding prayer meetings. More so, they all agreed, the ICC question was going to be at the heart of the Kibaki succession campaigns.
Search for presidential aspirant
But still, the search for a presidential aspirant, who would take on Mr Odinga was on. By this time, Mr Kenyatta was willing to deputise any candidate, while Mr Ruto had accepted to become a Majority Leader.
Multiple sources say that it was Mr Kenyatta who reached out to VP Musyoka in October 2012, and he was asked to take a stab at the presidency.
Then Mr Wanjigi drove Mr Musyoka to Mr Ruto’s house and the arrangement was explained to him. But there was one condition on the table — he had to fold his Wiper party and join Ruto’s URP. It was Mr Wanjigi’s idea that if Kalonzo did that, he will not be seen as coming from a party with roots among the Kamba.
For two weeks, Mr Wanjigi is known to have brought together a committee that included David Musila, Mutula Kilonzo, Johnson Muthama and Mailu to negotiate with Mr Ruto’s team of Charles Keter, Joshua Kutuny, and Davies Chirchir.
In order to reveal the line-up to the media, a lunch meeting was organised on October 12, 2012 at the Norfolk and the information leaked. A photo was taken of Kenyatta, Kalonzo and Ruto. Mr Wanjigi did not show up at the briefing, opting to stay away from the glare of the cameras.
With Kalonzo dilly-dallying on folding his Wiper party, Mr Wanjigi, according to insiders in the plot, called a meeting between Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto. The meeting was held in Lavington, where Mr Kenyatta had opened an office, only known to a few people. So secret was this meeting that Jomo Gechaga, Mr Kenyatta’s personal assistant, was the one who brought in lunch.
It was during this meeting that Mr Wanjigi advised Mr Kenyatta to run for president and Mr Ruto to take up the deputy slot.
According to Mr Musila, in his autobiography, Mr Wanjigi called him and asked him to first convince Mr Musyoka to take up the offer.
In a meeting held at Mr Musyoka’s Yatta Farm which was attended by Mr Musila and Ms Nyiva Mwendwa, Kalonzo was advised to take the Uhuruto offer or bolt out. “Time was running out and we did not think there were viable options for him. We later met elders from Ukambani and briefed them on the Yatta discussions. They advised that we seek a fresh strategy,” recalled Mr Musila.
That evening, a meeting was organised in Kalonzo’s Karen home, which was attended by Mr Kenyatta, Mr Ruto and Mr Wanjigi. “On that night, Uhuru and Ruto arrived at my home in the company of Jimmy Wanjigi, a Nairobi businessman and political strategist... We walked down to the gazebo where dinner was to be served.”
“Ruto and Jimi sat silently as Uhuru spoke: “Stephen,” he said, “We have decided that you should choose some other position, but not the presidency or deputy presidency.’’ I was stunned. I did not know at what point the arrangement we had earlier, of me being on the presidential ticket, had been changed.”
The group tried to reason with Kalonzo thus: ICC is a political court and if we are not in power we might not know our future.
Kalonzo insisted that he could only consider the deputy president as the “reducible minimum”. But when he mentioned that the much Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto could be jailed at the ICC was 10 years, the meeting ended.
Time was now running out and the team tried to get Charity Ngilu on board – and have her sign a Memorandum of Understanding together with Mr Kenyatta’s TNA and Mr Ruto’s URP at the Jeevanjee Gardens.
While Ngilu did not turn up at Jeevanjee during the December 3, 2012 signing — which told off the ICC and Koffi Annan — it was Mr Wanjigi who was given the original documents to keep. “I still have them,” he told the media when he was under siege from the government.
But shortly after the Jeevanjee Garden meeting, and formation of Jubilee Coalition, another group of power brokers — including some Kenyatta family members — approached Mr Kenyatta and convinced him to cede the presidential ambition to Mr Mudavadi, who had signed a coalition with Gideon Moi’s Kanu.
The Kenyatta family members feared that the campaign might put the family into disrepute — when intermixed with the ICC question.
By this time, and on December 5, 2012, Mr Musyoka had gone to the Odinga camp and both ODM and Wiper had formed the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD). Their first meeting was held outside Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC).
“I was surprised to learn that I had unexpected visitors. Our domestic detail announced that Uhuru and Ruto were outside,” Mr Mudavadi recalled in his autobiography.
It was during this breakfast meeting that they proposed that Mr Mudavadi should join their coalition as the presidential candidate.
“I reached (Dr Boni) Khalwale, Mukhisa Kituyi and Dan Ameyo to come as my witnesses in this new development…a quick one-page memo of understanding was drawn.”
After that, Mr Kenyatta asked for some time to, according to Mr Mudavadi, “bring in his people on this new development…before the formal announcement. But in time, the word was everywhere that Uhuru and Ruto had pulled out of the race in my favour.”
As Mr Mudavadi waited to be endorsed by Uhuru and Ruto, he later wrote, he was surprised two days later to see Uhuru blaming some “demons who had misled him to step down.”
We can now authoritatively report that shortly after the Mudavadi meeting — where Mr Wanjigi was side lined — Mr Kenyatta once again reached out to his St Mary’s friend for advice. Apparently, according to sources privy to the developments, Mr Kenyatta was to take up the campaign chairperson’s position.
On Thursday December 12, 2012, some 40 MPs allied to him threatened to abandon him if he was not the presidential candidate.
“If it is not Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, then all roads would lead to Bondo,” said assistant minister Kareke Mbiuki.
For six hours in Mr Wanjigi’s office, Mr Ruto, Mr Mudavadi and Mr Kenyatta sat negotiating the MOU. While Mr Mudavadi was opposed to Mr Wanjigi’s presence, he (Wanjigi) secretly convinced Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto that if Mr Mudavadi left, he would hurt Mr Odinga more than he would the coalition.
On December 18, 2012 during a TNA meeting at the KICC, Mr Kenyatta was pressured to be the presidential flagbearer of the Jubilee Coalition.
Finally, Mr Wanjigi had triumphed — and with the election of the Jubilee coalition, he thought that he could now sit back and watch the political drama while doing business.
