Ebola demands more than border screening – it requires community vigilance

The recent Ebola outbreak, identified as the Bundibugyo ebolavirus disease, has sent shockwaves across the region. It adds to a worrying trend of infectious disease surges, coming soon after the ongoing Mpox outbreak. This strain is particularly dangerous: it has a high case fatality rate, and unlike two other Ebola variants, there is no ready vaccine.

The Africa CDC recently ranked Kenya among the top 10 countries most at risk of spread. In response, Kenya has intensified screening at border points, activated emergency operations centres, and heightened surveillance. But civil society groups working with communities say these measures are not robust enough for the scale of the outbreak now unfolding across East and Central Africa.

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The current outbreak, centred in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and already spreading into Uganda, has been classified by the World Health Organization as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), the highest alarm level under the International Health Regulations. 

A PHEIC does not mean a pandemic, but it signals a serious, unusual event with risk of international spread, requiring coordinated action and strengthened surveillance, border preparedness, and response systems.

Uganda has confirmed seven Ebola cases linked to the outbreak, including infections among health workers in Kampala. The DRC has recorded 904 suspected cases, 101 confirmed, 119 suspected deaths, and 10 confirmed deaths. WHO officials warn the epidemic is spreading faster than response efforts. An effective vaccine is still six to nine months away, removing the most powerful tool for ring vaccination strategies.

Ebola's long incubation period means exposed people can travel across borders before symptoms appear. In a region of intense cross-border trade and migration, transmission chains become hard to detect. Experts warn that mobile populations and trade corridors complicate surveillance.

Formal surveillance alone will not be enough. The first line of defence must be communities themselves: public awareness, rapid symptom recognition, and alertness. Community vigilance, backed by strong public health systems, stops isolated infections from becoming national emergencies.

Kenya has been fortunate. Unlike Uganda, we have never faced widespread Ebola transmission. But luck is not preparedness. At key entry points along the Kenya–Uganda border, one of East Africa's busiest corridors, visible preparedness remains uneven.

What is needed now is detailed micro-planning at border points and within communities. Every level must be involved: community health structures, counties, public health officials, transport operators, religious leaders, schools, and politicians.

Urgency is heightened by ongoing political campaigns and large public gatherings. Rallies, funerals, markets, and social events will accelerate spread if the virus crosses in. Uganda has already suspended some religious events and urged people to avoid handshakes and mass gatherings. Kenya should not wait for local transmission before beginning proactive public communication.

Also read: Kenya on high Ebola alert as seven tested and cleared

The challenge is compounded because Ebola initially resembles malaria or flu – fever, fatigue, body aches; easily dismissed or misdiagnosed.

That means Kenya’s surveillance strategy must become much more sophisticated and community-centred. Monitoring should not stop at hospitals. Pharmacies and local clinics should become part of an expanded surveillance network. Unusual spikes in the purchase of fever medication or flu treatment in specific communities could become early warning signals worth investigating.

Communities themselves can become the country’s strongest surveillance partners if they are adequately informed. Many people may not immediately seek formal healthcare, but neighbours, families, community health promoters, and local leaders are often the first to notice unusual illness patterns or unexplained deaths. The government must therefore invest heavily in trusted public communication now, before fear and misinformation take hold.

But beyond the immediate outbreak, this moment should force Kenya to confront a larger structural weakness: its disease surveillance architecture remains underdeveloped for the scale of regional health threats it often faces. Too much of the country's surveillance capacity still depends on external donor funding tied to specific diseases or short-term programmes. Such funding models rarely build the flexible systems needed to respond quickly to emerging pathogens.

Kenya urgently needs nationally owned and domestically funded surveillance systems. That means investing in modern laboratory capacity capable of identifying new pathogens in real time, expanding the number of trained field epidemiologists, and strengthening cross-county coordination. Surveillance cannot function effectively as fragmented county-level efforts because outbreaks do not respect administrative boundaries.

The lesson is always the same: preparedness cannot begin after the first confirmed case. It begins long before – through trust, communication, community involvement, and constantly alert systems. Kenya still has an opportunity to act early. But the window for preventive action is narrowing rapidly.

The author is executive director, Resilience Action Network Africa