Egypt and Turkey may have had difficult times in the past decade, but they are both allies of Somalia, with which they have signed defence co-operation agreements.
That is why when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi toured Ankara this week -- marking the first time such a visit has happened in 12 years -- it signalled something beyond their bilateral ties.
The two sides had had animosity, but their leaders, Al-Sisi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were now talking of raising trade and working on regional issues, including Gaza conflict.
Yet, looking at Middle Eastern countries merely as enemies or allies may be misleading. For example, while animosity has been used to describe the ties between Cairo and Ankara, they had been cooperating on humanitarian scores in the conflicts in Sudan and Gaza, and previously offered to mediate.
The appearance of either rivalry or alliances seems to be a strategic means to achieve interests, especially in the Horn of Africa where countries are in need, in conflict and in chaos.
Analysts who spoke to The EastAfrican say Middle Eastern states have deliberately competed, or collaborated, in various countries on the Horn, depending on what works well. One reason for that, argued Dr Hawa Noor, an independent researcher and author, is that countries on the Horn have not worked on policies to relate with the Gulf, or the wider Middle Eastern region.
“Anybody who does not have a good strategy is up for grabs. If places are up for grabs, we know what is at stake in these countries -- some are strategically positioned, some have minerals, others have oil and many other resources,” said Dr Noor, who is also a fellow at the Institute for Intercultural and International Studies (InIIS), University of Bremen.
“It is not like Somalia is their first priority, but because of their issues. It behoves these countries to unite and have a proper strategy. They have to know that something happening in one territory spills over to the next. It is better to unite to avoid this kind of meddling.”
That meddling, however, didn’t start today. And Dr Noor agrees that past mistakes, including the colonial era, broken institutions and other malpractices in governance, invited the richer Middle Eastern countries.
“All this is linked to the past, or, to say bluntly, it is linked to poverty because of resources, people want to leverage their positions.”
Turkey took advantage of Somalia’s 2011 drought to install its presence. It sent in aid, helped train the military and built the largest embassy on the continent. But the ambition was to also develop business relations. Turkish firms manage the port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport. They have since signed a deal to explore oil.
In Somalia still, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have all helped support Somali security forces.
But they have not all been entirely welcome, and have been in friction elsewhere on the Horn.
Egypt recently delivered arms to help Mogadishu’s battle against al-Shabaab, and Cairo is preparing troops to deploy in Somalia, as part of the African Union Security Support Mission (Aussom) mooted to replace African Union Transition Mission (Atmis).
That move angered Ethiopia, which saw Egypt as seeking alliances as it bickers with Addis Ababa over the mega dam over the River Nile.
The UAE, which had initially built a training base for the military in Somalia, was gradually eclipsed there. But then they strengthened military ties in Ethiopia along with Turkey, helping support Addis Ababa’s war against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Abu Dhabi, meanwhile is at odds with Egypt in Sudan.
While it is accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Egypt has been an ally of Sudan Armed Forces.
Dr Hassan Khannenje, a peace and security analyst and director of the Horn Institute for Strategic Studies in Nairobi, said Middle Eastern countries do not normally have the same interests in each of the Horn of Africa countries.
“The apparently confusing and conflicting Gulf interests in the Horn of Africa can be understood from three dimensions,” he said.
“One is a multiplicity of interests by each Gulf player leading them to adopt what may be viewed as contradictory relations with regional countries, leading to very blurred policies.”
That confusion has in turn created a sense of free for all, turning the Horn into a playground.
“A lack of a clear policy framework by individual States as well as lack of a common regional approach have further exposed Horn countries to Gulf machinations, making them primary theatres for Gulf geopolitics,” he added.
Indeed, even the stable countries in the region have no policies directly guiding how to deal with multiple interests. Djibouti, for instance, strategically located, has attracted powers beyond the Gulf, seeing China, Japan, US and France establish airbases there.
The country is located near a busy strait, one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. But it is poor and that means it has allowed in anyone keen to pay the rent.
In the past, Djibouti ran into trouble after revoking a contract for running the main port, which it had given to a Dubai company.
Jihad Mashamoun, an analyst on Sudanese affairs at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, says the problem is not just about lack of resources, but also about political leaders trying to survive in power. That means they can work with whoever wants to support them stay longer. Sometimes the Gulf countries work with rivals of those in power.
“If we look at Sudan, Eritrea, and possibly Somalia, they have good dealings with Saudi Arabia. But all three have problems with UAE, somehow,” he told The EastAfrican.
The UAE was especially in controversy during President Mohamed Farmaajo’s administration (2017-2022), whichaccused Abu Dhabi of supporting subversion. Farmaajo instead strengthened ties with Qatar and stifled a UAE programme to train and pay Somali soldiers.
He sees UAE’s stronger ties with Ethiopia as suspicious because the Emiratis have also worked with the breakaway region of Somaliland.
“For the past 15 years, the Horn of Africa has been the subject of both influence and interference from wealthy Gulf countries. Alliances have changed, but the meddling has persisted,” argued Dr Adam Aw Hirsi, Director of Foresight for Practical Solutions, a Mogadishu-based public policy think-tank.
“Certain Gulf nations have taken clear stances in internal conflicts in Horn countries, leading to government changes, support for unpopular regimes, and involvement in inter-country disputes. Whether this external influence has a positive or negative impact on the Horn region depends on who you ask within the Horn.
“However, one thing is clear: The Horn could benefit more if Gulf monarchies directed their financial resources towards poverty alleviation and participated in purely developmental initiatives,” Dr Aw Hirsi said.
Dr Mashamoun suggested that relations may change based on whether someone honours a deal. For example, Eritrea in the past allowed UAE to use its port for military purposes but was undercut. Asmara then cooled the ties with Abu Dhabi and focused on Saudi Arabia instead.
Eritrea’s tensions with the UAE are partly because Abu Dhabi has stronger relations with Ethiopia as well, he argued. Allies during the Tigray war (2020-2022), Ethiopia and Eritrea have gradually grown apart and Asmara has since stopped direct flights by Ethiopian Airlines.
Qatar has some stable relationship with Sudan, as was with Somalia, and, to some extent, is making inroads to Ethiopia.
“At the same time, it is encouraging those countries to look for alternatives. Sudan has been focusing on Qatar being an alternative destination for its gold rather than the UAE. Eritrea, close to Saudi Arabia, and Somalia signed several military pacts that now resulted in Egypt being involved, which bothers Ethiopia and its patron UAE.”
“Eritrea is always going to be suspicious because it sees Qatar close to the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamists in Sudan created and supported the Eritrean Islamist Jihad Movement that challenged the regime in Eritrea.”
But Eritrea and the Sudan junta have been close, suggesting a friend of Khartoum could likely be accepted in Asmara.
In the end, only interests and how to manage them will matter, analysts argue.
