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Sudan war: What’s in it for the United Arab Emirates?

Suda war

this handout photo taken on April 23, 2023 and released on April 24 by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry shows smoke rising from a building next to a damaged car on a street in Khartoum. Foreign nations have pushed  with frantic evacuations of their citizens from chaos-torn Sudan, where heavy fighting raged for a 10th day between forces loyal to two rival generals

Photo credit: AFP

The United Nations has accused foreign players of prolonging the war in Sudan, making it harder for the country to find peace. The fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces started in April 2023. It was sparked by two generals competing for power after a failed political transition.

Since then, the conflict has taken on a regional and international dimension. Several external actors are supporting the two warring parties with arms, ammunition and money. The United Arab Emirates is emerging as one of the foreign players most invested in the war.

We asked May Darwich, who has studied the alliances that countries in the Middle East form in the Horn of Africa, for insights into this evolving situation.

Why is peace proving elusive in Sudan?

In a little over a year of civil war, Sudan has become the site of one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. The country – the largest agricultural producer in Africa and seen as a potential breadbasket for the region – is now on the brink of the worst famine in the world.

According to the UN refugee agency, more than 7 million people are internally displaced, nearly 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries and 25 million (half of the population) are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Estimates suggest that over 20,000 people have been killed since the war began in April 2023.

Yet, prospects for peace are dim.

Fighting shows no signs of abating, efforts to hold peace talks have failed and the involvement of foreign actors is prolonging the violence.

Regional powers and neighbours have lined up behind either of the two generals at the centre of the conflict: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Both warring parties have since been accused by the UN of committing war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Sudan is surrounded by major arms-trafficking hubs. Weapons and ammunition are smuggled in through countries like Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Countries like the United Arab Emirates and Iran are supplying the war through these countries. This violates a UN arms embargo against Sudan.

Which are the biggest foreign players?

Several regional and international actors have a stake in the outcome of the conflict.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, support the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Libya and Russia (through the Wagner Group) support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

The UAE has emerged as the foreign player most invested in the war. It views resource-rich, strategically located Sudan as an opportunity to expand its influence and control in the Middle East and east Africa.

Since 2018, the UAE has invested over US$6 billion in the country. This includes foreign reserves in the Sudanese central bank, agriculture projects and a Red Sea port. The UAE has also recruited and paid fighters from Sudan, drawn mostly from the Rapid Support Forces, to join its conflict in Yemen.

Since 2019, the UAE has undermined Sudan’s democratic transition following the ouster of long-serving president Omar al-Bashir. Abu Dhabi empowered both the army and the paramilitary force against the civilian wing of the government. With the outbreak of the civil war, the UAE has focused on the Rapid Support Forces.

Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied its involvement in arming the paramilitary force or supporting its leader Hemedti. However, the evidence suggests otherwise and the UAE’s dark role in the war has become an “open secret”.

The announcement by US rapper Macklemore cancelling an October 2024 concert in Dubai over the UAE’s role “in the ongoing genocide and humanitarian crisis” reignited international attention on Abu Dhabi’s role in the war.

The UAE’s involvement in Sudan highlights a broader pattern in this sheikhdom’s foreign policy in the last decade: aligning with local forces to secure geopolitical and economic interests across the Middle East and east Africa.

In Sudan, the UAE has joined forces with Russia to support the Rapid Support Forces through the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group has been active in Sudan since 2017, primarily in connection with resource extraction projects in regions like Darfur, where Hemedti’s forces were active and became a central ally in these endeavours.

According to UN experts, the UAE established logistical operations to send weapons to the Rapid Support Forces through its networks in Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Uganda. Armaments and supplies were disguised as humanitarian aid.

What’s in it for the UAE?

The interactions and alliances involving the UAE and the Rapid Support Forces reflect the complex and often opaque nature of modern geopolitical manoeuvring in Sudan.

Reports suggest that Hemedti acts as a custodian of Emirati interests in Sudan. These interests include gold and agriculture products.

Gold has been one of the main drivers of the Sudan conflict. It allows both parties to fuel their war machines. The UAE is the main beneficiary of this trade. It receives nearly all the gold smuggled from Sudan and has become a hub for laundering trafficked gold into the global market. The latest available statistics show that, officially, the UAE imported precious metals from Sudan valued at about US$2.3 billion in 2022.

Additionally, the UAE imports 90% of its food supply. Since the global food crisis in 2007, the UAE has made food security one of its highest priorities and started investing in farmlands abroad.

In Sudan, two Emirati firms are farming over 50,000 hectares in the north, with plans for expansion. Agricultural produce is then shipped through the Red Sea. To bypass the port of Sudan, which was run by the Sudanese government, the UAE signed a new deal in 2022 to build a new port on the coast of Sudan to be operated by the Abu Dhabi Ports Group.

The UAE has used the Rapid Support Forces to secure its interests and ambitions in achieving food security.

Who, and what, could break the Sudan deadlock?

The humanitarian situation in Sudan is worsening, but the international community has done little to address it.

In addition to its inability to raise sufficient aid for Sudan, the international community has applied no pressure on the UAE. The UN security council has failed to address the credible allegations by its own panel of experts on Sudan over Abu Dhabi’s involvement.

Human Rights Watch has accused the Rapid Support Forces of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the ongoing war. However, so far, there are no prospects for holding the UAE accountable for its role with the paramilitary force. The country continues to leverage its alliances with the west.

Unless the international community is willing to stop foreign actors from fuelling the conflict, Sudan risks descending into a catastrophic humanitarian crisis that will haunt the world for decades to come.


May Darwich is Associate Professor of Middle Eastern International Relations at the University of Birmingham.