Threats and deadly conflict over migration are spreading fast in South Africa. This is hugely worrying and could result in widespread injury and killings, as it has in the past.
The region’s investment prospects could be dimmed too, due to perceptions of political instability.
The need for effective responses is real and urgent. The death toll, while disputed, is rising, and reports of marches, threats, sacking of dwellings and violence are widespread across South Africa.
It is also being driven by campaign leaders and by politicians who support campaigns to root out foreigners, either actively or simply by justifying the arguments used by the more dangerous activists. The UN secretary general, Amnesty International and several foreign governments, including those of Mozambique, Nigeria and Ghana, have berated South Africa for not responding appropriately to anti-migrant mobilisation.
In a televised address on Sunday 7 May 2026, the country’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, outlined various initiatives to lessen the conflicts over migration. But was this a coherent response, or a missed opportunity to make real progress?
The core of the response was the five-point plan agreed to by a special cabinet committee meeting last week. The points included a law enforcement crackdown (including intensifying deportations), establishing dedicated immigration courts, rooting out employment of undocumented workers, securing borders, and tackling corruption (including a reform of identity systems.)
Ramaphosa admitted that economic conditions and the poor state of many public services explained why people were desperate and that grievances, including grievances about the influx of undocumented migrants, were “real”. Some have interpreted his stance as justifying the association of foreigners with the grievances that poor South Africans have.
Based on my work as a political economist in migration governance over the past decade, I know that virtually all the specific actions mentioned in the five parts of the plan had already been announced by the South African government, though not as a concerted platform to address the current crisis. Yet implementation has been painfully slow .
Clearly, there needs to be urgent and visible follow-through on these commitments. This should include the promise to clamp down on anti-foreigner agitators and those who have wounded or killed people they believed to be foreign. To my knowledge, very few agitators and attackers have been arrested, let alone charged. None of the leaders inciting dangerous actions have been arrested, or even called out by political leaders.
To help reduce the violence and the perception of risk, a number of additional steps need to be taken. Firstly, the forging of a collective political front of parties in the country against anti-foreigner activities. Secondly, the mobilisation of civic and religious institutions to fight against irresponsible politicking. Third, a renegotiation of colonial-era bilateral labour agreements with South Africa’s five neighbouring countries. And finally, addressing the country’s acute unemployment crisis.
Four steps that could make a difference
Firstly, the head of state – or the head of his political party – should bring together the leaders of all the significant political parties in a forum which commits to agreeing not to incite anti-foreigner sentiment, and also, as a group, condemns such behaviour.
Secondly, leaders of civic and religious institution could be encouraged to do the same – to warn against irresponsible politicking. Further than that, religious and community groupings could be encouraged and even assisted by government to drive programmes to include foreigners into the mainstream of South African society in a constructive way.
National, provincial and local governments could also drive initiatives to include foreigners into the national community. These could be standalone programmes or in cooperation with civil society institutions.
Thirdly, there should be a renegotiation of bilateral labour agreements with five neighbouring countries. In a white paper released in 2025 the government committed to establishing employment quotas for South Africans in various sectors of industry. It also committed to the renegotiation of the bilateral deals. The existing agreements are colonial in origin and form. They withhold virtually all labour and social rights from migrant labourers. And they don’t accommodate long-term labour migration contracts, now common in other parts of the world .
Such reforms could create more manageable as well as fair and equitable systems of migrant labour. South Africa could address its labour needs in a workable way. And the temptation to bypass the system should be lower, with fewer undocumented migrant workers.
It’s not realistic yet to do away with regional labour migration, but it could be far better managed.
Finally, Ramaphosa said he’d be sending out envoys “to seek to find sustainable solutions to these challenges”. But this has already been done, more than 20 years ago. South Africa and some of its neighbours agreed to a protocol on the facilitation of the movement of persons in the southern African region. This initiative was negotiated in the Southern African Development Community.
But since the protocol was signed by several heads of state in the region in 2005, there has been no progress. South Africa, its partners and the Southern African Development Community itself are guilty of negligence and should accept that they could have and can do more to avoid crises such as the present one.
But even before that is achieved, there is a great deal that could be done to eliminate the spark itself – tensions over migration.
Written by Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow at the New South Institute and Emeritus Professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town.
