With only Sh77 million remaining in its bank accounts, ODM is heading towards the 2027 General Election divided, financially vulnerable and uncertain whether it will challenge President William Ruto or help him secure a second term.
A year earlier, according to its published accounts, the party had Sh1.96 billion cash in its coffers.
But in just 12 months, its cash reserves have fallen by Sh1.883 billion, an extraordinary 96 per cent decline that has left ODM with barely four per cent of the financial cushion it held in June 2025.
While the party says it is owed Sh13.3 billion by the Political Parties Fund, it is apparent that for every shilling ODM had in the bank at the end of June 2026, it claimed approximately Sh173 from the state.
President William Ruto, ODM Party Leader Oburu Oginga and members of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) Central Management Committee and the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) Steering Committee during a joint consultative meeting at State House, Nairobi, on Thursday, April 23, 2026.
Photo credit: PCS
This imbalance goes to the heart of ODM’s political current predicament as an opposition party whose financial survival may depend on a government controlled by the man it must either oppose or support in the next election.
ODM’s annual accounts provide a financial portrait of a party not only struggling with the death of Raila Odinga, an unresolved succession but with a strategic alliance with Ruto that has divided its leadership and supporters.
Across the disclosed expense categories, expenditure increased from approximately Sh324.8 million in June 2025 to Sh780.3 million in June 2026. That was a rise of Sh455.4 million, or 140 per cent, in one year. Most of the expansion occurred in conferences, campaigns and administration—the activities through which political leaders mobilise supporters, negotiate alliances and consolidate control.
It appears that Raila’s death on October 15, 2025, not only removed the founder who had held ODM’s competing personalities, regions and ambitions together, but left with a fiscal problem. Though Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, assumed the leadership in an acting capacity before being formally installed in March 2026, he now runs a party that cannot manage a presidential campaign going by its financial status.
During that period, ODM held several well-financed rallies with new merchandise. That might explain why conference expenditure rose from Sh28.5 million in June 2025 to Sh284 million—an increase of almost 900 per cent. Conferences alone consumed more than 36 per cent of the listed expenditure. ODM spent more on them than it did on administration, campaigns, branch support, civic education, policy development or programmes for special-interest groups.
Some of this expenditure may reflect the cost of managing a party in transition. Following Raila’s death, ODM required meetings to reorganise its leadership, accommodate regional interests and determine its electoral direction. But “conferences” is too broad a description for expenditure approaching Sh300 million. The accounts however do not disclose how many meetings were held, where they took place, who attended and what organisational outcomes they produced.
Again, the accounts cannot establish whether these conferences strengthened ODM or merely financed negotiations among senior politicians. Nevertheless, the scale suggests that much of the party’s energy was directed towards managing its leadership crisis rather than building permanent institutions among its members.
Campaign expenditure also rose sharply, from Sh66.1 million to Sh163.5 million, an increase of 147 per cent. Conferences and campaigns together cost Sh447.5 million and consumed 57 per cent of the disclosed expenditure. Once administrative costs of Sh219.7 million are included, the three categories accounted for about 86 per cent.
It appears that ODM was spending like a party preparing for an election even though it had not settled the most basic question: would it field a presidential candidate, support Ruto or split between the two positions?
The uncertainty arose from the strategic accommodation initiated by Raila, before his death. After the 2024 protests, Ruto appointed several senior figures associated with ODM to his Cabinet. On March 7, 2025, Raila and Ruto signed a ten-point memorandum formalising cooperation on governance, devolution, corruption, economic reform and other national issues. Although the official announcement insisted that the agreement did not create a political union, it drew ODM closer to the government and blurred the line between opposition and administration.
After Raila’s death, the accommodation developed into an increasingly explicit electoral negotiation. Oburu’s leadership prioritised discussions with Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance, including ODM’s place in a possible 2027 coalition. In August 2026, Ruto and Oburu presided over a joint parliamentary retreat, demonstrating how far the relationship had moved beyond the original reform memorandum.
Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi, ODM national chairperson Gladys Wanga and Alego Usonga MP Samuel Atandi (left) during a women’s economic empowerment programme at Ndiru Primary School in Homa Bay Town constituency on June 26, 2026.
Photo credit: George Odiwuor | Nation Media Group
With no cash in its coffers, the alliance is strategically attractive to both sides. It offers ODM continued access to government, protection of positions held by its allies and a possible share of power after 2027. For Ruto, it opens the door to Raila’s traditional constituencies and weakens the possibility of a united opposition challenge.
But what may be rational for ODM’s senior leadership is dangerous for ODM as an independent political party. The closer it moves towards Ruto, the harder it becomes to distinguish its programme from that of the government it was elected to oppose.
This contradiction has divided the party. The Oburu-led establishment, supported by leaders invested in the broad-based government, favours cooperation with Ruto. On the other side, figures associated with the Linda Mwananchi formation led by Edwin Sifuna and Babu Owino have argued that ODM should retain its opposition identity.
Against this background, the reduction in branch expenditure is especially revealing. While ODM increased conference and campaign spending by a combined Sh352.9 million, branch coordination and support declined from Sh41.2 million to Sh29 million. Branch support represented only 3.7 per cent of the listed expenditure, down from nearly 13 per cent when Raila was alive.
While a divided party requires strong branches through which members can debate its direction and rebuild legitimacy from below, it appears that ODM instead concentrated resources at the centre, where national officials could negotiate alliances and distribute positions.
As ODM heads to the general election, the deeper question is whether the party can survive without Raila’s authority, symbolism and national following. Raila was not simply ODM’s leader; he was its principal organiser, presidential candidate, coalition builder and final arbiter.
ODM’s weak financial independence deepens the political dilemma. Public contributions and donations increased from Sh53.2 million to Sh62.4 million but covered only 8 per cent of the disclosed expenditure. Amounts owing from members rose from Sh5.3 million to Sh9 million. While ODM remains a mass party. It raises surprisingly little money directly from its members and supporters.
It is claiming that it is owed Sh13.3 billion from the Political Parties Fund increased from Sh12.3 billion in 2025. While cooperation with Ruto may strengthen ODM’s efforts to recover the money, it also reinforces the impression that its future depends on accommodation with the government. A party seeking billions from a government controlled by its prospective coalition partner may find it difficult to exercise complete political independence.
A deeper analysis of the accounts show that ODM’s crisis is organisational, financial and ideological. It is spending more while concentrating its resources on conferences, campaigns and central administration. It is preparing for an election without deciding whether it belongs to the government or the opposition. While it has found a successor to Raila, it has not replaced the authority that enabled him to manage its contradictions.
With Raila’s demise saw the removal of secretary-general Sifuna in June 2026 and his replacement in an acting capacity by Catherine Omanyo. Sifuna had become the party’s most visible critic of ODM’s absorption into Ruto’s political project. His removal therefore signalled the consolidation of the pro-government faction and a narrowing of the space for internal dissent.
The accounts reveal a party trying to spend its way through an identity crisis: rich on paper but poor in cash, more active nationally than locally, and increasingly tied to Ruto even as part of its membership resists that alliance.
