Daniel arap Moi (left) and Charles Mugane Njonjo.
As the US and USSR ramped up their Cold War rivalry in Africa in the 20th century, the Americans turned to a secret weapon which gave them a clear advantage over their nemesis: the legion of American Christian missionaries already doing the Lord’s work in various stations on the continent.
A new book, ‘Accidental Diplomats- American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa’ by Philip Dow investigates this often overlooked chapter in the history of the race for supremacy in Africa by the two then Superpowers.
Dow, who was born in Ethiopia but schooled in the United States and the Rift Valley Academy in Kenya, narrows down his focus on his country of birth, its neighbour Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo in his book.
“Basically, these three countries were all very important nations in the Cold War in Africa. They were also host to relatively large numbers of American missionaries during the 20th Century.
However, their histories were very different. As a result, by looking at these three important countries, I would hopefully be able to see whether the influence of American missionaries, if it existed, was consistent regardless of cultural and historical context, or whether it differed based on that context,” Dow said, in response to an emailed Weekly Review enquiry.
He now heads a school in Germany after a stint at his alma mater in Kenya.
“This book offers a deep dive into the complex interplay of evangelical missions, African politics, international diplomacy, and Cold War strategies. It explores the significant yet subtle role of faith in shaping international relations in Congo, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The narrative brings to light key events and influential figures, unravelling the intricate web of religion and global power politics,” the book’s blurb says.
Dow’s well researched book dives into the politics of pre-independence Kenya and the role Christianity played. It quotes one incident in 1948 when a colonial official summarised Jomo Kenyatta’s speeches as a plea for Kikuyu nationalism and a call to “get back to the old religion [because] Christianity is like the weevils that spoil the corn, and we [the Kikuyu] are the corn.”
The book notes that as Kenyatta interacted with regional leaders who had come to prominence during his self-imposed exile (in Britain), his tone became more moderate and his references to Christianity more flattering.
“Kenyatta’s increasingly moderate message was especially apparent during his visit to the AIM (African Inland Missions, the percussor to the African Inland Church) stronghold of Eldama Ravine during the immediate build-up to the Mau Mau uprising where he spoke out strongly against the movement.”
Dow says in the book that Kenyatta’s reputation for ardent African nationalism, his close ties to the militant independent school movement and his former links to Moscow and European leftists, all made him a target of suspicion within the colonial government.
“As a result, in 1952, along with five others including the Pentecostal prophet Bildad Kaggia and the AIM product Paul Ngei, Kenyatta was found guilty of Mau Mau activity and detained indefinitely.”
Come independence and the Americans were getting wary of the kind of foreign policy Kenyatta would pursue as the head of state. However, it turned out to be a false alarm because as Dow notes, although Kenyatta was facing attacks from populists like Kaggia and Ngei; and maintaining a ‘non-aligned’ Cold War posture, it was soon evident that Kenyatta was staking out a relatively non-ambiguous pro-Western path.
While political necessity required that some left-leaning politicians like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Achieng Oneko be included, the independent republic’s first cabinet was dominated by moderate mission-church products.
“At least seven of the 20 cabinet posts were filled by products of American missionary schools, three others had completed either their university or graduate training in America, and the majority of rest could boast of similarly strong links to British missionaries.”
When Kenyatta ran into turbulence from Jaramogi and his people, Kenyatta moved to rein him in. in the ensuing commotion, Kenyatta handed the home affairs to “the American mission-educated Daniel arap Moi.”
Dow says that Moi proved to be over-zealous and attributes this to the man’s loyalty to Kenyatta and that his efforts “also betrayed an underlying commitment to a zealous and missionary-inspired anti-communism, as well as a conservative that saw stability and order as the necessary foundation for prosperity, peace, and freedom.”
There was some disquiet in Kisumu and Nairobi about Kenya’s involvement in the crisis that was unfolding in the Congo and Dow, quoting from the first American ambassador to Kenya Michael Attwood’s book, ‘Reds and Blacks’, says that one day Moi went straight to the ambassador and assured him that despite the public flares of discontent, majority of Kenyans were on the side of America.
“In fact, just hours after his discussion with Moi, Attwood met with some of the approximately fourteen hundred American missionaries working in the country whose widespread pro-American sentiment produced in the diplomat an optimistic prognosis for US-Kenya relations,” the book notes.
Confirming the reports of the missionary community was a 1965 public opinion poll in which 50 per cent of Kenyans responded that of all the world’s nations, America had “done the most to help the country.”
Although as the official representative Attwood was quick to praise his government’s efforts in achieving this feat, in private much greater stock was placed on the continuing role of the missionary community, which analysts in Nairobi argued “have in the past exerted great influence on Kenya’s evolution (and) are likely to continue to do so.”
Members of Kenyatta’s government were in fulsome praise of the missionaries and their work with the Minister of Education Jeremiah Nyagah while speaking at a graduation ceremony at an AIM school for missionary children urged the graduates to come back and help Kenya because “we know the value of second generation missionaries.”
All this time the tiff between Jaramogi and Moi was at a boil. Moi disliked Jaramogi and his leftist leaning thoughts while on his part Jaramogi scorned the “influence of the missions” on Moi and his inability “to make independent judgement (s).”
Jaramogi would later resign in a huff to political oblivion while Moi was promoted to the vice president and later succeed Kenyatta. On being named vice president, Moi formed a strong alliance with another pro-Western leader Charles Njonjo. The two were from staunch Christian backgrounds.
“This religious bond also had a strong family-and by extension missionary- connection. Njonjo’s wife Margaret, was the daughter of the AIM missionaries who had baptised the young Moi and who were among the several evangelical missionaries who mentored Moi into young adulthood and beyond. While Margaret’s parents hailed from Northern Ireland, the majority of the AIM missionaries who played a prominent role in Moi’s spiritual, educational and political development were American.
At the height of Mau Mau rebellion in 1955 Moi was asked to join politics and run for a seat in the Legislative Council, Legco. Despite its aversion to worldly politics, the blessing of one AIM missionary was critical to Moi’s transition into government. Born and raised in Kenya as a missionary child, the Kalenjin speaking Earl Andersen was the natural bridge between the Western and African worlds that Moi now found himself in.
“The result of Moi’s intimate relationships with the missionaries of AIM was not only a lifelong loyalty to the missionaries and the missionary enterprise, but a worldview that, while distinctly Kalenjin, reflected the values and political sympathies of the American evangelical brand of Christianity under which he was raised.”
As the vice president, Moi was in the sights of the Americans who were convinced that he would one day be the president of Kenya. So much so that he had the rare chances of a vice president to meet with both Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter at different times.
“Following free national elections, three months later Moi was inaugurated as Kenya’s second president with his missionary mentors looking on proudly.”
Moi would soon visit the former colonial master Great Britain as his first foreign visit. In the absence of a first lady, Margaret Njonjo acted in that capacity. Her parents had baptized Moi and had played a key role in the translation of the Kalenjin bible.
“But there were other ways Moi’s missionary coloured religion permeated the visit. At his insistence, a special Sunday service was arranged at which Tom Houston, the former pastor of Nairobi Baptist Church and the future president of World Vision, preached.”
Soon after the London visit, a tragic event in faraway Iran would serve to bolster Moi’s international Christian credentials. On 4 November 1979, radical supporters of the Islamic revolution occupied the American embassy in Tehran. Some 52 Americans were taken hostage triggering an international diplomatic crisis.
In place of diplomatic efforts, Moi called for a national day of prayer in Kenya and followed it up with a letter to other heads of state urging them to do the same. This had a profound effect on President Carter.
In a letter written a month after the crisis began, Carter thanked Moi in the most religiously intimate terms. “Words cannot express the deep appreciation (first lady) Rosalyn and I have for your concern and care that you have demonstrated for us during these days. Thank you for the spiritual leadership you have given throughout the world at this time to call the people of all nations to pray…we are very grateful for your personal expressions of love in Christ and the prayers of you and your countrymen…”
Dow concludes that had US-Kenya relations been unimportant, this deepening relationship between two evangelical Christian leaders could easily be dismissed as an interesting but largely irrelevant footnote in the history of Cold War in Africa.
Moi’s stance during the Cold War largely reflected that of his missionary friends which meant that it was oro-America. In Earl Andersen, Moi also had a close confidant in whom he could confide all matters, including those of the state. This continued right up to Andersen’s death in an accident in 1985.
“Whatever the content of these meetings may have been, Andersen’s strong, and generally pro-US, political opinions make it likely that during the first seven years of Moi’s presidency, Washington had a powerful advocate close to the Kenyan president.”
With time, Moi’s human rights record would be a matter of concern in Washington and even with the arrival of Smith Hempstone as the ambassador in 1989, US sentiment was still strongly pro-Moi.
However, the fall of Berlin Wall later that year and the subsequent reappraisal of US interests in the post Cold War world, exposed the extent to which US support to Moi had began to crumble.
“Over the next decade, the US increasingly drew a distinction between its support for Kenya and its support for Moi, leaving, leaving the famous product of American missions feeling, in the words of one confidant, “betrayed”.
Despite the betrayal, Moi and his government remained steadfast in their pro-US sympathies despite the Americans becoming more critical.
“The result was that when Moi stepped aside in 2002 upon the election of Mwai Kibaki as president, US relations with the new government was cordial- if not as intimate as they had been during the Cold War zenith of Moi’s presidency.”
