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How to beat insecurity conundrum in the horn of Africa
Tigray soldiers arriving in Mekele on June 29, 2021.
For nearly two decades, the Horn of Africa has borne the brunt of extremist violence—from al-Shabaab’s deadly insurgency in Somalia to continuing attacks across Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, marked by cross-border infiltration and homegrown radicalisation. Yet the threat endures, and in some cases escalates.
In 2024, the four deadliest extremist groups, including al-Shabaab, were responsible for 4,204 deaths globally—an 11 percent increase from the previous year, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2025. Despite decades of investment in counterterrorism, the threat persists and, in some cases, has intensified, reaching into the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The reasons are clear: responses are too often overly militarised, fragmented, and detached from the socio-political realities of the region’s people. Luckily, leaders have started to notice. On August 14, African Chiefs of Defence (Achod) issued a joint communique, a first of its kind, with the United States Africa Command (Africom), outlining what they called Africa-led security operations.
The document, co-signed by General Charles M Kahariri of Kenya and General Michael E Langley of Africom, provided a proposal built on five pillars—renewing and expanding security partnerships, building a common vision for security, inspiring innovation against emerging threats, strengthening defence institutions, and promoting African leadership.
Somalia remains the epicentre of extremist resurgence in the region. Al-Shabaab continues to exploit power vacuums and weak governance. In just the first half of 2025, several high-profile attacks laid bare the depth of the threat. These included the 11–12 March Beledweyne hotel assault (21 killed), the 18 March assassination attempt on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (10 killed), the 23 March Garissa, Kenya raid (six officers killed), the 18 May Mogadishu recruitment centre bombing (20 killed), and the July 9 military academy attack (five killed).
Despite intensified joint offensives by Somali, AU, and Ethiopian forces, recent US aid cuts to elite Danab units risk weakening security and allowing al-Shabaab to expand regionally.
Each incident is a reminder that Somalia’s instability is not an isolated crisis but fuels insecurity across the region. Al-Shabaab’s ability to strike repeatedly undermines public trust and disrupts governance. As the Achod Communiqué emphasises, no one country can tackle this alone; it requires shared resolve and pooled resources to stabilise Somalia politically, economically, and institutionally.
Kenya’s role in counterterrorism is critical, but it faces its own vulnerabilities. Youth unemployment sits at a staggering 67 per cent for those aged 15–34, with 800,000 young people entering the job market annually, many lacking vocational or tertiary skills. Frustration has spilled into the streets: mid-2025 protests, largely driven by Gen Z disillusionment over unemployment and governance, left more than 66 people dead nationwide.
Additionally, the grand Lamu Corridor project—a Ksh 3.2 trillion (US$25 billion) infrastructure plan—has stalled as al-Shabaab attacks have repeatedly disrupted construction, scuttled progress on roads and pipelines, and isolated communities. Only three of 23 port berths are complete, and just 10 percent of a vital road segment is paved.
In counties like Garissa, Mandera, Lamu, and Kwale—already targeted by extremist recruiters—lack of opportunity is a weapon in itself. As the communiqué’s “strengthening defence institutions” pillar notes, security solutions cannot rely solely on firepower; they must also build public confidence. In Kenya’s case, that means cutting corruption in youth development programmes, ensuring funds reach the ground, and creating real job pathways.
Terrorist groups operate transnationally. Yet counterterrorism frameworks in the Horn remain disjointed. The Achod Joint Communiqué’s strategic pillars are more than policy language; they are avenues to build systems capable of detecting cross-border threats, disrupting extremist logistics, and fostering community-wide resilience.
Recent regional operations demonstrate the power of cooperation: in November–December 2024, Interpol and Afripol arrested 37 terrorism suspects across East Africa—including 17 in Kenya (two linked to ISIS), and others in Somalia and Tanzania. Such efforts show what is possible when intelligence sharing and coordination are prioritised.
Extremism feeds on marginalisation, weak governance, and hopelessness. A purely military approach will never uproot it. Community-driven initiatives such as vocational training for at-risk youth, local peace committees, and rehabilitation for former fighters are as important as joint operations.
The communiqué itself acknowledges this “whole-of-society” dimension. By integrating economic opportunity and civic trust into security strategy, the Horn can turn its youth into agents of stability rather than recruits for chaos.
From Beledweyne to Garissa, the stakes are clear: Somalia’s instability fuels attacks; Kenya’s unemployment fuels recruitment; fragmented regional action fuels vulnerability. The Achod roadmap offers a way out—but only if leaders act on it.
Successful counterterrorism will not be defined by the number of soldiers deployed, but by the livelihoods replaced, the institutions trusted, and the futures built. If leaders accept the challenge not just militarily, but structurally, the Horn can move from the brink to stability. The time for fragmented responses is over; the moment for coordinated, people-centric strategy has arrived.
Somalia must be intentionally supported and motivated towards lasting stability because instability, there, fuels resurgence everywhere. Kenya must match counterterrorism rhetoric with anti-corruption reforms and genuine youth empowerment. In addition, the whole region must act in concert, using Achod’s principles to build the kind of security architecture that extremists cannot easily exploit.
If these steps are heeded, the Horn could finally begin to bend the curve from reactive crisis response to proactive, sustained peacebuilding. The alternative is more of the same: a cycle of instability, costly military operations, and a generation of young people left vulnerable to violent extremism.
By August 2026, when the Chiefs reconvene, success should be measurable in fewer attacks, stronger institutions, and visible economic opportunities in vulnerable communities. The Horn has a chance to replace the cycle of reaction with a cycle of prevention.
