The histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia have long been closely intertwined. Once part of Ethiopia, Eritrea launched an armed struggle for independence in 1961 that resulted in its secession in 1993 following a referendum . But since Eritrea’s independence, relations between the two countries have evolved through many ups and downs, which include a devastating war from 1998 to 2000, followed by two decades of mutual isolationism.
What’s the history of conflict between the two countries?
A border dispute in 1998 ignited a deadly war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which share a border of over 1,000km. The war started when Eritrean troops invaded Badme, a contested town in Tigray, the northernmost region of Ethiopia. It became one of the deadliest conflicts of contemporary Africa as tens of thousands lost their lives.
The war ended in June 2000 with the Algiers Agreement. It established a ceasefire, mandated the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and created a boundary commission to legally demarcate the disputed border. However, the fact that borders are yet to be demarcated means tensions could persist.
At the time, Ethiopia was ruled under a four-party political coalition created and dominated by Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, ruled the country between 1991 and 2018.
Eritrea’s ruling party was historically an ally of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. That changed because the ally was in charge of Ethiopia when it won the war.
Tensions have flared from time to time. The border is heavily militarised, with a no man’s land between the two armies serving as a security corridor.
Abiy Ahmed’s peace overtures to Eritrea in 2018 and the resulting peace agreement were lauded by many in the global community and locally. Most recognise that the countries have more in common than what sets them apart.
But the agreement did not lead to increased political and economic cooperation. It created only a short-lived marriage of convenience. Here is why.
After Abiy came to power in April 2018, the Tigrayan grip on Ethiopia ended. In November 2020, the Tigray war started. Eritrea blamed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front for its own economic and political fragility and isolation, and supported Abiy against the Tigrayans.
The Tigray war became a devastating conflict with allegations of war crimes committed by all parties – but most were attributed to the Eritrean troops.
The prospect of a new war in the ever volatile Horn of Africa would threaten a region already ravaged by the ongoing conflict in Sudan.
What’s driving the present tensions?
Despite the peace agreement in 2018 between the countries, fault lines persist. The biggest is access to the sea.
Eritrea’s independence in 2000 gave it control of a long coastline across the Red Sea, but left populous Ethiopia a landlocked nation. Addis Ababa now depends on the goodwill of its neighbours like Djibouti for port access.
In recent years, especially since the Tigray war ended in 2022, Abiy has brought up the topic of access to the sea, naming Eritrea and Somaliland as potential avenues. He argues that Ethiopia has a historical claim to Eritrea’s port of Assab, which is a mere 60km from the Ethiopian border.
Indeed, many Ethiopians consider the loss of access to the sea as a national tragedy . Abiy’s plea for a diplomatic solution that would give Ethiopia access to the sea has galvanised support at home.
This has angered Eritrea, which doesn’t accept Ethiopia’s claim to Assab.
Eritrea President Issaias Afeworki (left) is welcomed by Ethiopia Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on July 14, 2018 at Addis Ababa Bole International Airport for his official visit to Ethiopia after more than twenty years in border conflict among the two neighboring countries.
The second fault line is Eritrea’s documented support to various Ethiopian rebel organisations and movements in recent periods. This support was evident before the peace deal in 2018. There are also new allegations of Eritrean military support for Tigrayan and other rebellions in Amhara and Oromia, especially since 2022.
The most important fault line, however, has developed in the aftermath of the Tigray War. Eritrea fought on Ethiopia’s side during the war. When the war ended, Eritrea complained that it was not consulted or invited by Ethiopia to be a party to the peace accord.
Ethiopia now claims that Eritrea has switched alliances. After the Tigray war concluded and a provisional administration was installed in Mekelle, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the government of Ethiopia failed to address their differences. And Eritrea extended its hand to its historic foe, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
In October 2025, Ethiopia’s foreign minister Gedion Timothewos wrote to the United Nations accusing Eritrea of making new incursions into Ethiopia’s territories and movement of its troops into Tigray.
He claimed that Eritrea’s collusion with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had become “more evident over the past few months”. He also accused Eritrea of “funding, mobilising and directing armed groups” in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, where militiamen known as Fano have been battling the federal government.
In February 2026, Ethiopia also wrote to Eritrea demanding the withdrawal of troops from its territory. Eritrea fired back that the allegations were “patently false and fabricated ”.
The danger of a return to war is real. And time is running out for diplomatic and political efforts to defuse tensions. In its letter to Eritrea, Ethiopia said it remained open to dialogue. Addis also indicated willingness to engage in broader negotiations, including maritime affairs and potential access to the sea through the port of Assab.
A dialogue could address Ethiopia’s desire for reliable sea access and Eritrea’s fears of an attack on its sovereignty.
Diplomacy now could prevent the onset of conflict. Just three years after the Tigray war – and with the Sudan war soon dragging into its fourth year – the region can ill afford another. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, the African Union especially needs to invite both countries to the negotiating table before time runs out.
By Yohannes Gedamu – Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett College
