Kenya's position in the global peace rankings has deteriorated, with the country dropping five places from 127th in 2025 to 132nd in the 2026 Global Peace Index, as insecurity, regional conflicts and growing economic vulnerabilities continue to weigh on its peace profile.
The country's score also worsened from 2.392 to 2.447.
Kenya is ranked 33rd among 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, a region that the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which produces the index, says experienced a further deterioration in peacefulness during the year.
The report placed Kenya within a much wider and increasingly interconnected security environment in the Horn of Africa, where conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan are no longer viewed as isolated crises.
"The Horn of Africa is no longer a set of separate conflicts," the IEP noted, adding that the conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia "are now interlocked through every channel that causes conflicts to spread."
The Horn, according to the report, is bedevilled by conflicts spreading through multiple channels at the same time. These include refugee and displacement flows, circulation of arms and combatants, illicit economies, rebel sanctuaries, cross-border ethnic ties, external state sponsorship and proxy warfare, transnational ideological networks, demonstrations and strategic emulation, as well as weak state capacity.
The report stated that whether a conflict crosses a border depends on the mechanisms activated, the density of cross-border ties and the resilience of neighbouring states.
"Whether a given conflict spreads depends on which mechanisms are activated, on the density of cross-border ties, and on the institutional resilience of neighbouring states," it stated.
For Kenya, the implications are particularly significant because of its geographical position and its security involvement in the region. The report identifies Somalia's continuing conflict as one of the principal channels through which insecurity spreads across the Horn.
Al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated armed group operating in Somalia, continues to conduct cross-border operations into Kenya and Ethiopia. The report estimates that the group generates between US$100 million and US$150 million annually through charcoal exports, port taxation and extortion, giving it the ability to finance its operations independently of external sponsors.
This means that the threat facing Kenya is not confined to conventional military conflict. The regional conflict system also encompasses the movement of people, money, weapons, fighters and ideology across borders.
The report also made another notable observation about Kenya's role beyond its immediate borders. Kenya was among the countries involved in the largest number of external conflicts between 2020 and 2024, with the United States, Niger, France, Kenya and Chad each involved in eight or more external conflicts during the period.
The finding comes as the report records a broader internationalisation of conflicts. In the five years preceding the 2026 index, 103 countries were at least partially involved in an external conflict, compared with 59 in the 2003 to 2008 period.
Kenya's overall peace score also masks different dimensions of insecurity. Its Societal Safety and Security score is 2.927, compared with 2.358 for Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict. The report assesses countries across three broad domains: societal safety and security, ongoing domestic and international conflict, and militarisation.
The wider regional picture is troubling. Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a 0.2 per cent deterioration in peacefulness in the 2026 index.
The region remains the third least peaceful of the eight GPI regions, with 23 countries improving and 21 deteriorating, and is now home to eight of the world's 20 least peaceful countries, compared with five in 2008.
Sudan's war was identified as a particularly important source of regional instability. More than 12 million people have been displaced by the conflict, while external actors and illicit economies have increased its severity. The war's effects extend into neighbouring countries through refugee movements, weapons flows, political alliances and economic disruption.
With regard to the instability in Sudan, Kenya, alongside Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and the Central African Republic, was adversely mentioned, with the report saying that the listed countries "are believed to have supported the Rapid Support Forces at various points".
South Sudan, for example, has received more than one million people from Sudan since the outbreak of the war in April 2023. The report said many are South Sudanese returnees who had previously fled their own country's conflict, even as weapons continue to move across the Sudan-South Sudan border.
Ethiopia’s attempts to secure independent access to the Red Sea have contributed to heightened tensions with Somalia and Eritrea. The report noted that Ethiopia's dependence on Djibouti for about 95 per cent of its international trade has made access to the Red Sea both an economic and strategic concern.
Against this already volatile backdrop, the report identified the Iran war as a new external shock capable of intensifying existing pressures in the Horn.
"The Iran war is a force multiplier for the spread of conflict and has amplified existing pathways by raising prices in import-dependent states, distracting Gulf countries supporting conflicts and highlighting the strategic importance of Red Sea ports."
The conflict has disrupted maritime corridors and affected food and energy markets. The report said three existing mechanisms of conflict spread are particularly affected: Gulf states are changing their priorities, Red Sea maritime corridors have been disrupted, and food and energy price shocks are increasing fiscal pressure in import-dependent countries.
Kenya is particularly exposed because wheat accounts for roughly 24 per cent of cereal consumption, a level similar to Ethiopia and Somalia. During the Red Sea disruptions of 2023, food price inflation in parts of East Africa reached 30 per cent, illustrating how disturbances along regional trade routes can quickly affect households and economies.
Gulf states, the report noted, supply about 45 per cent of global sulphur and 50 per cent of global urea. Reduced supplies following disruption caused by the Iran war could affect fertiliser availability during the 2026 planting season, with the resulting impact on harvests expected to emerge in the second half of 2026 and into early 2027.
For Kenya, this agricultural shock comes at a particularly sensitive time because of its external financing obligations.
The report also identified US$900 million in Kenyan external debt maturities in November and December 2026. Pakistan faces US$1.9 billion and Egypt US$2.3 billion over the same period, bringing the combined debt rollover requirement for the three countries to US$5.1 billion.
The timing is significant because the debt maturities coincide with the expected effects of fertiliser shortages on East African harvests. Kenya is also identified as one of the countries facing IMF programme reviews, at a time when food price pressures could complicate fiscal management.
The report described the simultaneous pressures from IMF reviews, harvest outcomes and debt refinancing in the second half of 2026 "as an unprecedented concentration of risk."
For Kenya, the significance of the GPI assessment goes beyond the five-place fall in the global ranking. It presents a country facing overlapping pressures: insecurity linked to Somalia and the wider Horn conflict system, involvement in external security theatres, exposure to refugee and arms flows, and vulnerability to disruptions in Red Sea trade.
These security pressures are now intersecting with food, energy, debt and fiscal risks, further blurring the boundaries between security, regional conflict and economic stability.
