Premium
Exposed: Secret Russia war recruitment pipeline putting Kenya on the spot
Former Kenyan athlete Evans Kibet.
What you need to know:
- Young Kenyans, it admitted, had been lured into Russia by “corrupt and ruthless agents” using falsified documents.
- Kenyans forced into Russian uniform are not soldiers – they are victims of trafficking and forced labour.
Kenya’s uneasy silence over reports that its citizens were donning Russian military uniforms to fight Ukrainians finally broke on October 27, 2025, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a terse, unusually blunt warning.
Young Kenyans, it admitted, had been lured into Russia by “corrupt and ruthless agents” using falsified documents and bogus job promises — only to find themselves “caught up” and detained inside Russian military camps.
The statement stopped short of calling it human trafficking, yet in legal terms, it described precisely that.
Behind the government’s warning lay more than a year of steadily mounting public alarm. In March 2024, Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Dr Korir Sing’oei dismissed a claim by Russia’s Defence Ministry that five Kenyans were fighting for Ukraine, insisting the allegation was baseless and reaffirming Kenya’s policy of non-interference.
The official line was meant to stem the rumours, especially as no proof then existed of Kenyans serving in Russia’s ranks. But speculation persisted – soon fuelled by images and videos showing young Kenyan men in Russian uniform, shouting their names into the camera or dancing in the forest. Shared widely on pro-Russian X and Telegram channels, the clips framed them as eager volunteers. That narrative collapsed under later testimonies.
Kenya’s moment of reckoning came when former athlete Evans Kibet appeared in a Ukrainian prisoner-of-war video describing how he had been misled into joining Russia’s war. His testimony made the crisis impossible to deny. Reports soon emerged of a handful of former fighters – “returnees” – slipping quietly back into the country, some sick, others destitute, most simply relieved to be alive. Mothers and wives began crowding the Directorate of Criminal Investigations and the Diaspora Affairs office, clutching passport copies and screenshots of documents, begging for help to trace missing relatives. The pleas were stark: “It has been months since I heard from my son. I don’t know if he’s alive or dead.”
Ukrainian serviceman from mobile air defence unit fires a machine gun towards a Russian drone in Kharkiv region.
Under pressure, the issue climbed to the highest levels of diplomacy. On November 6, 2025, President William Ruto phoned President Volodymyr Zelensky to plead for Kibet’s release and raise the broader matter of Kenyans illegally recruited into Russian units. Zelensky warned of a rapidly expanding recruitment pipeline drawing African men into Russia’s war.
These concerns aligned with findings presented in Kyiv on November 18, 2025. At the Crimea Global Conference, General Dmytro Usov of Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said 18,000 foreign fighters from 128 countries had signed contracts with Russia’s Defence Ministry by October 2025, while another 3,000 whose contracts had expired were being held against their will. Of those currently serving, 1,400 were African citizens from 36 countries. Since 2022, Russia’s staggering troop losses have pushed it to recruit between 30,000 and 40,000 new fighters every month, according to Western intelligence and independent Russian investigations.
For security expert Munira Mustaffa of Verve Research, none of this is surprising. Both sides have foreign fighters, she noted, but the recruitment systems differ sharply. Ukraine’s International Legion, created in 2022, uses formal, state-sanctioned processes: applicants submit documents, undergo screening and sign contracts placing them under Ukraine’s military command. “Where Ukraine suffers administrative failures, Russia uses deliberate manipulation,” Mustaffa said. She described Russia’s system as one that relies on deception, trafficking networks and the exploitation of economically vulnerable populations.
In this context, Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi’s statement carried weight. It acknowledged that many Kenyans had been drawn in through forged documents, impersonation of Russian officials and fabricated job offers. Some recruits were scattered across Russian camps; others vanished deeper into the system. “Unscrupulous agents” infiltrating recruitment procedures were blamed. Legal experts flagged one line as particularly concerning: victims were being “held up for military operations” and pressured to sign what Russia called “voluntary contracts”.
Legally, the issues are clear. “The position of Kenyan and international law depends on how – and for what purpose – one joins a foreign military,” said Dr Owiso Owiso, an international law scholar. Enlisting voluntarily in a regular national army is not prohibited. Doing so through deception or for participation in an active conflict raises serious legal problems. Under Kenyan law, deception-based recruitment constitutes human trafficking. The African Union’s 1977 Convention on Mercenarism has yet to address the growing involvement of African nationals in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Legal options are available to Kenyan families. Dr Owiso noted that relatives can file constitutional petitions for violations of Articles 27 and 30, targeting both the government and the recruiters. A landmark ruling last week strengthened their case: in the Haron Nyakong’o judgment – involving a Kenyan trafficked to Myanmar – the Employment and Labour Relations Court held that deception occurring in Kenya is sufficient to establish jurisdiction even if exploitation happens abroad. The court ruled that confiscation of Nyakong’o’s passport amounted to forced labour and awarded over Sh5 million in compensation.
Forced labour
International law reinforces these protections. Kenya and Russia are both parties to the Forced Labour Convention, and the ban on forced labour is a jus cogens norm – universal and non-derogable. Dr Owiso added that the International Criminal Court could investigate individual recruiters if trafficking contributed to war crimes in Ukraine – a high but not unprecedented threshold.
For many recruits, their motivations explain why the deception worked. Interviews with Ukrainian POWs revealed a common theme: these were not ideological fighters. They were economically desperate. They reported receiving a signing bonus of about 1.9 million roubles (roughly Sh3 million) and monthly salaries of around 210,000 roubles (about Sh349,000). But the real profits go to the recruiters, who earn roughly one million roubles (about Sh1.63 million) per fighter delivered – making the pipeline far more lucrative for agents than for the men they funnel to the frontline.
Kenya’s crisis fits a wider pattern. South Africa is confronting an almost identical case: 17 men stranded in Ukraine’s Donbas region after signing contracts written in Russian, a language none could read. Relatives say they were pressured into signing. The scandal deepened when Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla resigned as an MP on November 28, 2025 amid allegations she had helped recruit them.
If Russia releases the South African group, it could set a precedent by cracking what former fighters describe as an “unbreakable” contract system. Once taken to a Russian base, they said, it no longer matters whether a recruit was duped. Commanders dismiss complaints, often feigning language barriers, and deliberately separate men by nationality to weaken resistance and impede escape. A release would offer Kenyan families a crucial opening to demand the same – something Russia may be reluctant to allow.
Ukrainian artillery fires towards the frontline during heavy fighting near Bakhmut, Ukraine, on April 13, 2025.
As the crisis unfolds, a quieter but equally consequential battle is taking place within Kenya’s own institutions. Security officials, immigration officers and labour regulators are now confronting uncomfortable questions about how such a vast recruitment network operated for so long without detection. Interviews with officers familiar with the early inquiries suggest that gaps in border control, weak oversight of labour export agencies and a thriving black market for forged documents created an ideal ecosystem for traffickers. The slow acknowledgement by authorities mirrors a deeper systemic problem: for years, Kenya has lacked a coordinated mechanism to monitor the outflow of vulnerable jobseekers, leaving thousands exposed to exploitation long before Russia’s war came into view.
So far, Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed only four repatriations: Shaquille Wambo, Pius Mwika, Derick Njaga and Kevin Kariuki Nduma – all “irregularly conscripted”. The government has not disclosed the number detained, missing or dead, stating only that more than 200 Kenyans may have joined Russian forces. Many fear the true toll is far higher.
Fear and uncertainty
Families live in suspended dread. Silence from Russia has become its own message. “You know your child is dead when he stops calling,” said one woman, whose son remains unable to leave Russia after surrendering his passport. Another rushed to Kenyatta National Hospital after hearing a returnee had been admitted, desperate to know whether he had seen her son. He had – but could offer no reassurance that he was alive.
Phones have become a fragile lifeline. We reviewed videos the men sent home – some in uniform, others recorded quietly in forest camps – and brief texts assuring their families they were “fine”. Returnees have become an unexpected source of solace, offering what clarity they can to strangers bound together by fear and uncertainty. Yet a near-total silence persists among families, in stark contrast to Kibet’s relatives who went public early. Most seem compelled to bear their fears in private.
Evans Kibet.
Kenya continues to walk a delicate diplomatic line. Mudavadi’s statement avoided naming Russia, focusing instead on “agents”. The government is trying to protect its citizens without provoking Moscow – or alienating Kyiv.
The truth is that the Kenyans forced into Russian uniform are not soldiers – they are victims of trafficking and forced labour. As Dr Owiso put it: “The key question is not how many Kenyans are in Russian uniform, but how they got there. Where deception is involved, the law treats them as victims – and the recruiters as criminals.”
Follow our WhatsApp channel for breaking news updates and more stories like this
