United Democratic Alliance (UDA) Secretary-General Hassan Omar’s decision to contest the Mombasa governorship has exposed growing fault lines in the emerging political partnership between the ruling party and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), threatening a delicate attempt to coordinate their campaigns at the Coast in the 2027 General Election.
By declaring this week that he will remain in the race, Mr Omar has effectively challenged the efforts to use political zoning to prevent the UDA and the ODM from competing against each other in key coastal counties.
For the past month, negotiations between the two parties have reportedly focused on an informal arrangement under which each side would be allowed to dominate selected counties while supporting its partner’s candidates elsewhere.
But Mr Omar has rejected the idea, arguing that voters and party members should be free to choose their preferred candidates.
“Let us unite and choose our leaders freely. In Kwale we have seen that ODM does not want zoning; we in UDA also do not want zoning. We cannot be dictated to by anyone. We will make our own decisions,” said Mr Omar.
United Democratic Alliance (UDA) secretary general Hassan Omar speaks to the media in Nairobi on May 19, 2026.
Photo credit: Bonface Bogita | Nation Media Group
His position complicates efforts to translate the national cooperation between President William Ruto’s UDA and ODM into a common electoral strategy in Mombasa, where both parties have competing political interests and potential gubernatorial candidates.
The dispute also exposes the limits of political agreements negotiated at the national level when they encounter strong local ambitions.
At the Coast, political parties have historically relied on negotiated alliances and community mobilisation to consolidate their support. But the approach is becoming increasingly difficult as politicians position themselves for the 2027 elections and seek to protect their individual political bases.
Mombasa is particularly sensitive because it is one of ODM’s traditional strongholds. The party has dominated county politics for years, while UDA has been seeking to expand its influence in the region since President Ruto’s administration came to power.
Mr Omar’s entry into the race therefore represents more than a personal gubernatorial ambition. It could become a test of whether UDA can penetrate an ODM stronghold and whether ODM can retain its political dominance after joining the broad-based government.
His declaration comes at a time of uncertainty for ODM's political organisation at the Coast, following the death of its long-standing leader, Raila Odinga, and the party's participation in the government's broad-based arrangement.
The changes have created space for rival political forces to attempt to reorganise support in areas where ODM previously enjoyed a strong grassroots presence.
UDA appears keen to exploit that opening, and the party’s strategy could involve presenting itself as an alternative vehicle for coastal politicians who feel excluded from ODM’s decision-making structures or dissatisfied with the party’s cooperation with the government.
The contest is not limited to Mombasa in Kwale; sections of ODM are pushing the party to field its own gubernatorial candidate instead of supporting Governor Fatuma Achani, who is associated with UDA.
President William Ruto (right) with Ministry of Mining, Blue Economy and Maritime Affairs Cabinet Secretary Hassan Ali Joho at State House, Nairobi, on November 19, 2024.
Photo credit: Francis Nderitu | Nation Media Group
Last week, Mining Cabinet Secretary Hassan Ali Joho faced grassroots resistance during an ODM meeting at Vingujini Grounds in Kwale, where some residents openly challenged the proposed cooperation between the two parties.
The confrontation provided a glimpse into the difficulty national leaders face in selling political agreements to grassroots supporters.
A local resident, Ms Donate Mwavale, confronted Mr Joho and demanded that party leaders listen to ordinary voters, particularly women, before making decisions on political alliances.
“CS, listen to us. Listen to the women here. They are your mothers. They are the ones suffering,” Ms Mwavale told Mr Joho.
She also warned the former Mombasa governor against ignoring grassroots sentiment, telling him: “Huo ukingpin wako tutauvuwa usipokuwa serious!”
The confrontation was significant because it showed that opposition to zoning does not only come from rival political parties. It is also emerging from within the parties themselves, where local candidates fear that national agreements could influence election outcomes before voters have had the chance to vote.
Political insiders familiar with discussions between UDA and ODM have suggested that Mombasa, Kilifi and Tana River could fall within areas where ODM would be given greater political space, while UDA would concentrate on Kwale, Taita-Taveta and Lamu.
Such an arrangement would be intended to minimise direct competition between the two parties and create a broader coalition ahead of the 2027 presidential and county elections.
But Mr Omar’s position demonstrates the difficulty of enforcing such an agreement, particularly where senior politicians have already built personal campaigns.
UDA party secretary general Omar Hassan.
Photo credit: File | Nation Media Group
For UDA, Mombasa represents an important strategic target; control of the county would give the ruling party a stronger foothold in the Coast and potentially reshape the region’s political map. It would also challenge the perception that coastal politics remains firmly anchored in ODM.
For ODM, retaining Mombasa is equally important. Losing the county would represent a major symbolic and organisational setback at a time when the party is attempting to rebuild its structures and political relevance after Mr Odinga’s death.
The emerging contest could therefore force ODM to choose between preserving its national cooperation with UDA and protecting its local political interests.
The same dilemma faces the UDA. While cooperating with ODM could help the government to consolidate its support nationwide, enabling ODM to retain its traditional stronghold on the coast without competition could restrict UDA’s long-term expansion in the region.
The Coast could consequently become one of the first major testing grounds for whether the UDA-ODM relationship can evolve from government cooperation into an electoral alliance.
The Mombasa contest will also be closely watched because of the region’s broader political history. Coastal voters have frequently shifted allegiance when they perceive established parties as failing to address local economic, land, employment and development concerns.
Mr Omar’s campaign could therefore focus not only on party politics but also on presenting UDA as a vehicle for a new political coalition at the Coast.
For ODM, the challenge will be to convince its grassroots supporters that cooperation with the government does not amount to surrendering the party’s traditional political space.
The events in Kwale suggest that this message is far from settled. As the 2027 election approaches, national political negotiations may continue to produce broad agreements, but local politicians and voters are increasingly asserting their independence.
Mr Omar’s decision to stay in the Mombasa race has made one thing clear: the Coast will not easily fit into a neat political zoning formula.
The battle for Mombasa, and potentially Kwale and other coastal counties, could ultimately determine whether UDA and ODM emerge as genuine electoral partners or remain uneasy allies whose cooperation stops at the national level.
