President William Ruto (left) and his French counterpart Emmanuel Mr Macron will on May 11 and May 12 host the African Forward Summit.
MPs have approved a defence cooperation deal with France, giving Paris a soft landing after reputation challenges in West Africa.
However, there are reservations about the substance of the Kenya-France Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) itself, a framework that outlines how the two countries will work together across a wide spectrum of military and security issues.
It establishes structured cooperation in joint military training and exercises, intelligence sharing, exchange of personnel and defence policy dialogue. The deal also extends to peace-keeping, maritime surveillance and counter-terrorism, areas in which both countries have overlapping interests.
For Kenya, the logic is clear. The country faces a complex and evolving security environment, from the persistent threats posed by Al-Shabaab to emerging risks in cybercrime and maritime insecurity.
French soldiers patrol in Bangui on December 6, 2013.
Strengthening partnerships with technologically advanced and militarily capable countries offers an opportunity to enhance capacity, improve coordination and bolster Kenya’s standing as a regional security anchor.
The agreement is designed to ensure interoperability between Kenyan and French forces, enabling them to plan and execute joint operations with minimal friction. A working group, comprising representatives from both sides, will oversee implementation and is expected to meet at least once a year.
This institutional mechanism signals an intention to maintain an active and evolving partnership rather than a static arrangement.
Though the agreement promises operational benefits, some aspects may raise scrutiny. One of the most consequential aspects of the pact lies in how it regulates the entry and presence of visiting forces. French military personnel will be permitted to enter Kenya using official identification and movement orders, bypassing standard immigration procedures, including visas.
Their equipment and supplies, imported for official use, will be exempt from customs duty and inspections, allowing for smooth logistics during joint exercises or missions.
France appears to have found a Kenyan plan B after losing face in Francophone West Africa. From Mali to Niger and Burkina Faso, governments have in recent years scaled back or terminated similar military arrangements with Paris, citing concerns over sovereignty, operational control and lingering neo-colonial influence. Senegal has followed suit.
President William Ruto on Friday discussed “Transforming Climate Finance” with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Kristalina Georgieva, President of France Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Rishi Sunak, President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo and the Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley, Dubai.
For Paris, the agreement with Nairobi comes on the backdrop of warming relations between the two countries, and especially between Presidents William Ruto and Emmanuel Macron.
Dr Ruto and Mr Macron will on May 11 and May 12 host the African Forward Summit, the first of its kind France-Africa summit outside Francophone Africa.
President Macron has invited Dr Ruto for the G7 Summit, which France will host in Evian from June 15 to June 17.
In the agreement signed with Kenya, French soldiers will be permitted to operate vehicles, arms and ammunition using licences issued in France.
However, they will do so strictly for authorised duties and under regulated conditions. While these provisions are standard in many defence agreements and intended to facilitate efficiency, they raise questions about oversight and the extent of control exercised by the host nation.
According to the deal, the presence of visiting forces is limited to activities agreed upon in the framework. However, practical enforcement of such limits often depends on the strength of domestic institutions and the clarity of accountability mechanisms.
France will retain primary jurisdiction over offences committed by its personnel in the course of official duties, while Kenya has jurisdiction over offences committed outside official duties or those affecting its citizens or national security. Both countries may waive jurisdiction.
This appears to strike a balance between respecting national sovereignty and ensuring functional military cooperation. However, some MPs said it introduces ambiguity that has long been a source of contention in similar agreements with other countries.
Determining what constitutes “official duty” is not always straightforward, particularly in complex operational environments. Where harm is caused to Kenyan civilians, the question of where justice is pursued and how it is administered becomes key.
The MPs were referring to the British Army Training Unit Kenya (Batuk). Unresolved issues surrounding the death of Agnes Wanjiru, reportedly at the hands of a British soldier who was never tried in Kenya, fuel scepticism about the effectiveness of such arrangements. Kenya has requested the extradition of the British soldier.
Belgut MP Nelson Koech, who chairs the National Assembly’s Defence, Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committee, was vocal on the need for accountability.
“Questions on jurisdiction have been common, and there is a need for clarity on jurisdiction,” he said when moving the motion in Parliament on Thursday.
“Our point as a committee is that when the visiting troops commit a crime, they should be tried by the host country, especially for cases like murder,” he said.
Parliament passed the DCA with France, “but subject to reservations,” National Assembly Deputy Speaker Gladys Boss said.
French President Emmanuel Macron shares light moment with President Ruto at the UN headquarters in New York on September 22, during the 80th United Nations General Assembly.
Mr Koech said he was aware of the concerns Kenyans have with such deals.
“I promise you that there will be no repeat of Batuk incidents. That is why we have expressed reservations on some of the clauses in the Kenya-France defence agreement,” he told the Sunday Nation by phone.
Gilgil MP Martha Wangari, who is a member of the committee, echoed the concerns on the floor of the House.
“We have been clear and have reservations with the DCA as a committee. Any offence committed in Kenya should be subject to the primary right of the host nation,” she said.
Ms Wangari stressed that serious offences must fall within Kenyan jurisdiction.
“Some matters like murder, sexual offences and gender-based violence should be handled in the host nation. Matters to do with torture and cruelty should be dealt with in the host nation. Matters to do with slavery, offences against a host nation, must be dealt with by the host nation,” she said.
For Ms Wangari and several MPs, the issues go beyond legal technicalities. They touch on the key principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done in the affected communities.
Defence cooperation agreements of this nature are not unusual. Mr Evans Ogada, an advocate and lecturer in public international law and human rights, said international law permits such arrangements.
“There is freedom by states to enter into agreements so long as those agreements do not violate jus cogens (norms that govern customary international laws),” he said.
He, however, cautioned that the broader implications must be carefully considered.
“Shielding foreign soldiers from prosecution presents the perennial challenge of uneven treaties for Kenya and Africa in general. We are forced to accept terms that are difficult and to our disadvantage,” he said.
Beyond the legal framework is the constitutional dimension. Kenya’s Constitution is widely regarded as progressive and people-centred, guaranteeing equality before the law, access to justice and the right to a fair trial.
Any agreement that appears to create parallel legal regimes risks undermining these guarantees.
From a human rights perspective, the concern is that victims of soldiers’ excesses may find themselves without effective remedies if cases are handled outside the Kenyan jurisdiction.
This raises the spectre of what Mr Ogada describes as an “impunity gap”, where accountability exists in principle but is difficult to realise.
French soldiers patrol in Bangui on December 6, 2013.
“Any agreement that creates parallel legal regimes – one for foreign military actors and another for citizens – risks contradicting the constitutional promise that all persons are subject to the law equally,” he the don said.
Compounding these concerns is the limited role of Parliament in shaping such agreements, as Ms Wangari pointed out.
“Lawmakers are constrained to approving, rejecting or passing treaties with reservations, without the ability to amend their contents,” the Gilgil MP said.
“The House should look at the Treaty-Making and Ratification Act and our standing orders so that the MPs are not reduced to conveyor belts.”
Kenya’s decision to deepen relations with France also stands in stark contrast to developments in other parts of the continent.
Across the Sahel, countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have taken the decision to terminate or scale back similar agreements, citing sovereignty concerns and dissatisfaction with the terms of engagement.
In Mali, for instance, the government accused France of violating its airspace and acting unilaterally, leading to the termination of defence accords and the withdrawal of French troops.
In Niger and Burkina Faso, juntas expelled French forces altogether, while Senegal has ended France’s permanent military presence. The Central African Republic has shifted its defence partnerships, turning to alternative allies.
These developments point to a broader re-evaluation of France’s role in Africa’s security, driven in part by historical grievances and contemporary political dynamics.
Kenya’s approach appears to chart a different course. Rather than distancing itself from France, Nairobi is deepening engagement, positioning itself as a stable partner and a hub for regional security cooperation.
This approach has raised questions about Africa’s evolving geopolitical landscape. While some countries are rejecting external military influence, others are embracing it, reflecting differing priorities and strategic calculations.
Kenya says the benefits of working with France are tangible. It cites enhanced training, improved intelligence capabilities and access to advanced military technology that could strengthen the country’s ability to respond to threats. Participation in joint operations and peace-keeping missions reinforces Kenya’s global standing, the government says.
However, the risks cannot be ignored. Expanding defence partnerships without fully addressing existing challenges, especially around accountability and community impact, could undermine public confidence and strain domestic institutions.
Parliament has sought to mitigate some of these risks by attaching reservations to the deal.
“As a committee, we have listed our reservations. We call for stronger environmental safeguards, clear designation of training areas and respect for local communities. Visiting soldiers must strictly adhere to Kenyan laws and customs,” the Belgut lawmaker said.
In the scheme of things, the Kenya-France Defence Cooperation Agreement offers opportunities for enhanced security and international collaboration, while raising questions about sovereignty, justice and equality.
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