Kenya has formally nominated Justice Njoki Ndung’u and Prof Phoebe Okowa for judicial positions at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), respectively, in the upcoming 2026 election cycle.
Pundits opine that these concurrent nominations to high-profile international judicial jobs could overstretch Kenya’s diplomatic mettle, scuttling one or both chances.
Elections for the six vacancies at the ICC will occur during the 25th Session of the Assembly of State Parties in New York between December 7 and 17, 2026.
Justice Ndung’u is set to compete against eight international candidates, namely, Dean John Nangela (Tanzania), Evelyn Ankumah (Ghana), Rosette Muzigo-Morrison (Uganda), Grendel Mattraux (Switzerland), Yoshimitsu Yamauchi (Japan), Diana Carolina Olarte (Colombia), Ana Peyro Llopis (Spain) and Veronica Wright (Gambia). On her part, Professor Phoebe Okowa was elected in November 2025 to fill a casual vacancy at the ICJ, serving until February 5, 2027.
Prof Phoebe Okowa Nyawade.
Photo credit: File | Nation Media Group
Kenya has formally launched its candidacy for a full nine-year term in the 2026 election cycle. So far, only Professor Dapo Akande (United Kingdom) has emerged to compete against Professor Okowa for the seat. In her 2025 election, Professor Okowa defeated Charles Jalloh (Sierra Leone), Tarheel Olufemi Elias (Nigeria), and Paul Kuruk (Ghana). These nations or others in the African Group may field candidates again for the 2026 election cycle. Should that happen, then Prof Okowa could be forced to re-activate the campaign machinery that delivered her win in the November 2025 election.
International judicial positions
The bigger question that many observers are asking, however, is the implication of Kenya concurrently fielding dual candidates for high-profile international judicial positions. This decision is seen as a high-stakes diplomatic gamble. To begin with, it dilutes Kenya’s diplomatic capital.
Those who are familiar with backstage diplomatic horse-trading argue that by simultaneously presenting two candidates for the same election cycle, Kenya could significantly overstretch its diplomatic mettle, effectively emasculating its capacity to deliver the seats. This could force the country’s allies to choose between the two candidates rather than support both.
Equally worrying is that this could turn out to be a strategic misstep that weakens the country’s overall leverage, as international goodwill is finite. In a globalised diplomatic landscape where countries have a nexus of relations, it is highly presumptuous for Kenya to imagine that its allies have no multiple loyalties to other countries.
The reality is that modern international relations are highly dynamic and concatenated, rendering it near-impossible for countries to safely “lock” their allies on a sustainable basis. We could draw lessons from the February 2025 African Union Commission Chairperson election in which Kenya presented former Prime Minister Raila Odinga. In that election, several of Kenya’s traditional allies and regional partners reportedly failed to support Raila Odinga’s bid.
While the vote was held via secret ballot, diplomatic analysts and post-election reports highlight a significant lack of unity within key blocs. Despite an official endorsement from the East African Community bloc, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi were specifically noted for their inconsistent support, despite earlier pledges. Somalia actively campaigned for the Djibouti candidate, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, after its own candidate, Fawzia Yusuf, was asked to withdraw to support Djibouti’s bid.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shifted its support from Raila Odinga to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) candidate, Madagascar’s Richard Randriamanrato, due to the country’s multiple memberships of regional blocs and the perceived Kenyan support for Rwanda and M23 militia activities. Sudan vigorously campaigned against the Kenyan candidate due to disagreements over the latter’s foreign policy regarding the former’s internal conflict.
Other key factors at play in that AUC election were religion, language, diplomatic gaps, and geographical proximity. Besides, it is not lost on diplomatic observers and analysts that during President William Ruto’s reign, Kenya has emerged as a strong voice on contemporary global issues, including international financial architecture, global wars and conflicts, climate change and adaptation, and the need to relook at human rights issues emanating from the predatory relationships between the Global South and the Global North.
Although these efforts have earned President Ruto lots of admirers globally, they have contemporaneously attracted jealousy towards the president and Kenya, especially among African countries.
These dynamics are likely to come to bear on the impending ICC and ICJ elections, and could force some of Kenya’s allies—especially those with candidates like Uganda, Ghana and Sierra Leone—into strategic recalibration.
So, what are the candidates’ chances of success? Professor Phoebe Okowa is a global intellectual resource person, thought leader and international law icon, with an impeccable track record of scholarship and practical work on complex arbitration processes involving countries.
Diplomatic analysts believe that Professor Okowa’s chances of success are very strong, given her recent historic win in 2025, where she secured an absolute majority in both the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Security Council (UNSC). Her incumbency and established reputation in international law provide a significant advantage for the full-term bid.
In any case, the memories of the 2025 election, which she won resoundingly, are still fresh, and without any meaningful changes having occurred at either the UNGA or the UNSC in the intervening period, it is highly unlikely that the voters could change their minds in favour of a different candidate. On her part, Justice Njoki Ndung’u’s bid for the ICC is competitive, facing a crowded field.
While Kenya has successfully placed a judge (Justice Joyce Aluoch) at the ICC before, the concurrent campaign for the ICJ may complicate the lobbying efforts required for an ICC win.
If Justice Ndung’u succeeds in her ICC bid, it would occasion a major vacancy in the Supreme Court of Kenya shortly before the 2027 General Elections, something that might send conspiracy theorists into overdrive.
Kenya needs to be meticulous and strategic in deploying its scarce diplomatic resources to target a candidate that stands a high chance of winning.
The country should particularly avoid being seen by other state parties as being greedy, which could lead to fatigue. Any diplomatic goof on the part of Kenya could easily return an empty net.
Professor Ongore is a Public Finance and Corporate Governance Scholar based at the Technical University of Kenya. [email protected]
